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INTRODUCTION
Sexual abuse is devastating for children. The psyche copes in various
ways. One way is by walling off traumatic memories and blocking them
from conscious recall.' Recognizing this, courts and legislatures in
more than half the states now toll statutes of limitation on childhood
sexual abuse until the victim is aware of the abuse and its psychologi-
cal consequences in adult life.2 These changes have been beneficial for
1. For a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon of psychological forgetting,
see JEROME L. SINGER, REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONALITY
THEORY, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND HEALTH (Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990). At various
points, this Article will address relevant clinical features associated with multiple
personality disorder (MPD). For ease of reference, the authors will, to the extent
possible, refer to the same primary text by Dr. Frank Putnam. See FRANK W. PUTNAM,
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER (1989). Dr. Putnam
heads the National Institute of Mental Health's Dissociative Disorders Unit and is rec-
ognized as one of the leading authorities on MPD. His book is based on research
done in conjunction with a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) study of 100
patients with MPD.
2. Legislatures in 23 states have adopted statutes postponing accrual of childhood
sexual abuse tort actions until the victim discovers the abusive acts and their psycho-
logical consequences in adult life. See ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.140(b)(1)-(2) (1991); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-56-130 (Michie 1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp.
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577d (West 1991); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para.
13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West Supp.
1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752-C (West
Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4c (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 541.073 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (Vernon Supp. 1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1991); NEv. REV. STAT. § 11.215 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:61B-1 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30 (Michie 1993); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAwS
§ 9-1-51 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-25 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-12-25.1 (Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 522, 560 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.340 (Supp. 1992).
Courts in 10 jurisdictions have adopted similar reforms without the aid of legis-
lation. See Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 63 (D.C. 1994); Fager v. Hundt, 610
N.E.2d 246, 253 (Ind. 1993); Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206, 218 (La. 1994);
Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Leonard v. Eng-
land, 445 S.E.2d 50, 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909
(N.D. 1989); McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797, 800 (N.H. 1994); Ault v. Jasko, 637
N.E.2d 870, 875 (Ohio 1994); Vesecky v. Vesecky, 880 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). For a discussion
of these changes, see generally Jacqueline R. Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil
Sexual Abuse Trials, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1185, 1196-1202 (1992); Rosemarie Ferrante,
Note, The Discovery Rule: Allowing Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse the
Opportunity for Redress, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 199 (1995); Gary Hood, Note, The Statute
of Limitations Barrier in Civil Suits Brought by Adult Survivors of Child Sexual
Abuse: A Simple Solution, 1994 U. ILL L. REv. 417 (1994); Jessica E. Mindlin, Com-
ment, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 65 WASH. L. REV.
189 (1990); Julie S. Silberg, Comment, Memory Repression: Should It Toll the Statuto-
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persons with multiple personality disorder (MPD). A large percentage of
people with this disorder report histories of childhood sexual abuse.'
MPD is hardly a new diagnosis. What is new is the unprecedented
rate at which this disorder is now being diagnosed. Studied by nine-
teenth century psychiatrists, MPD faded into professional obscurity
from the 1920s until the early 1980s.' This was the period when the
theories of Sigmund Freud had a monopolistic hold on clinical
ry Limitations Period in Child Sexual Abuse Cases?, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1589 (1993).
3. According to a NIMH study of 100 patients suffering from MPD, 97% percent
provided histories of childhood abuses, with 68% reporting sexual abuse. PUTNAM,
supra note 1, at 47. Findings from other published studies on the frequency of child-
hood sexual abuse in MPD patient populations have generally been consistent with or
even higher than the NIMH study. See, e.g., Suzette Boon & Nel Draijer, Multiple
Personality Disorder in the Netherlands: A Clinical Investigation of 71 Patients, 150
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 489, 492 (1993); Philip M. Coons et al., Multiple Personality Disor-
der. A Clinical Investigation of Fifty Cases, 176 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 519,
525 (1988); Philip M. Coons et al., Post-Traumatic Aspects of the Treatment of Vic-
tims of Sexual Abuse and Incest, 12 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 325, 326 (1989);
Carol A. Glod, Long-Term Consequences of Childhood Physical and Sexual Abuse, 7
ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 163, 165 (1993); Richard J. Lowenstein & Frank W.
Putnam, The Clinical Phenomenology of Males with MPD: A Report of 21 Cases, 3
DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 125, 139 (1990); see also Geri
Anderson et al., Dissociative Experiences and Disorders Among Women Who Identify
Themselves as Sexual Abuse Survivors, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 677 (1993). But
see generally Fred H. Frankel, Adult Reconstruction of Childhood Events in the Mul-
tiple Personality Literature, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 954 (1993) (contending that pub-
lished studies linking MPD to childhood sexual abuse are flawed and arguing that the
link between childhood sexual abuse and MPD has not yet been scientifically estab-
lished).
4. See, e.g., EUGENE L. BuSS, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY, ALLIED DISORDERS, AND HYP-
NOSIS 58-63 (1986); COLIN A. ROSS, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER: DIAGNOSIS, CLIN]-
CAL FEATURES, AND TREATMENT 27-38 (1989) (reviewing the scientific study of dissocia-
tion during the 19th century). There are a number of case reports for the period
between the late 1800s and the 1920s. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 4-6, 29-31
(reviewing the decline and rise of interest in dissociation); Elizabeth S. Bowman, Ado-
lescent MPD in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 3 DISSOCIATION: PROG-
RESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 179 (1990) (analyzing six multiple personality
cases reported between 1823 and 1926). Sigmund Freud was interested in multiple
personality disorder during the early phase of his career. See, e.g., Ross, supra, at
27-38. He later rejected the dissociative model of psychological forgetting, the infra-
structure of MPD, in favor of his own model based on the dynamic unconscious.
Freud's model attributed psychological forgetting to a mechanism he called "repres-
sion." Mainstream psychiatry embraced Freud's explanations and theories and ignored
dissociative disorders for the next fifty years. See BliSS, supra, at 54-58; PUTNAM,
supra note 1, at 31-36; Ross, supra, at 6-7, 30-36, 44.
thought.' Freud believed that incest memories were Oedipal fantasies
that the patient confused for reality.' The Oedipal fantasy theory divert-
ed clinical attention from trauma-induced dissociative disorders until
the early 1980s when this theory crumbled under the weight of empiri-
cal evidence that child molestation and incest is more prevalent than
previously believed.7 The collapse of the fantasy theory reawakened
interest in MPD and since then the numbers of diagnoses has risen rap-
idly.
8
The growing popularity of the MPD diagnosis has divided the clinical
community.' Some experts claim that MPD is rare and is now being
overdiagnosed,' ° while others assert that it is reasonably common and
5. Buss, supra note 4, at 54-58; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 31-36; Ross, supra note
4, at 6-7, 30-36, 44.
6. See also PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 31-34; JOHN BRIERE, THERAPY FOR ADULTS
MOLESTED AS CHILDREN: BEYOND SURVIVAL 33-36 (1989).
7. For comments on the factors behind the contemporary reawakening of interest
in MPD, see Ross, supra note 4, at 44-54; Richard P. Kiuft, An Update on Multiple
Personality Disorder, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 363, 363-64 (1987) (explain-
ing the growing interest in MPD); John G. Watkins, The Bianchi (L.A. Hillside Stran-
gler) Case: Sociopath or Multiple Personality, 32 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 67, 73 (1984).
8. Ross, supra note 4, at 37-44.
9. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders observes:
The sharp rise in reported cases of Dissociative Identity Disorder [the new
name for MPD] in the United States in recent years has been subject to very
different interpretations. Some believe that the greater awareness of the diag-
nosis among mental health professionals has resulted in the identification of
cases that were previously undiagnosed. In contrast, others believe that the
syndrome has been overdiagnosed in individuals who are highly suggestible.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 486 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
10. See, e.g., Paul F. Dell, Professional Skepticism about Multiple Personality, 176
J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISORDER 528, 530 (1988) (reporting results of survey); Corbett
H. Thigpen & Hervey M. Cleckley, On the Incidence of Multiple Personality Disorder.
A Brief Communication, 32 INT'L J. CUNiCAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 63 (1984).
The foremost critic of this diagnosis is an organization called the False Memory Syn-
drome Foundation. See generally Sandra G. Boodman, Advocacy Group for 'Aggrieved'
Parents Fight Back, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1994, at Z15 (introducing background and
purpose of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation) [hereinafter Boodman, Advocacy
Group]; Sandra G. Boodman, The Professional Debate over an Emotional Issue,
WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1994, at Z13 (discussing different opinions regarding the validity
of repressed memories) [hereinafter Boodman, The Professional Debate]. Members of
the Foundation reject the theory that psychological mechanisms can suppress traumat-
ic memories and attribute recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse to sugges-
tive psychotherapy practices. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 3, at 957-58; Elizabeth F.
Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOL 518, at 526-33 (1993);
Carol Gentry, Are Secrets Locked Inside?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at IA;
Sally Jacobs, Sex Abuse, Memories in Question, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1993, § 3, at
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often overlooked." Much about MPD remains controversial. Nonethe-
1; Amy Kuebelbeck, False Memory Backlash is Coming Pull Circle, WICHITA EAGLE,
Jan. 29, 1994, at 3E; Elizabeth F. Loftus, You Must Remember This ... or Do You?
How Real Are Repressed Memories?, WASH. POST, June 27, 1993, at Cl; Jeanne
Wright, Recalling or Fabricating Past Abuse?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at El; see
also infra notes 164, 169 and accompanying text. The Foundation's Scientific Adviso-
ry Board reads like the directory of Who's Who in Expert Witnesses for the Defense.
See Boodman, Advocacy Group, supra, at Z15. The organization encourages bringing
false memory lawsuits against therapists engaged in recovered memory treatment. See,
e.g., Sullivan v. Cheshier, 846 F. Supp. 654, 654-57 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (involving suit by
parent against therapist for creating false memories); Katy Butler, Clashing Memories,
Mixed Messages, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1994, at 12 (Magazine); Bill Scanlon, Therapists
Under Fire, Debate Brews: Do Some Counselors Brainwash Clients into Believing
They Were Molested?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 10, 1994, at 1D; Michael J.
Grinfeld & Joseph F. Duffy, Jury Awards Father $500,000 in Recovered Memories
Trial, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, June 1994, at 1; Virginia R. Knight, Psychiatrist Sued over
Methods: The Doctor Allegedly Prescribed Viewing 'Films of Sexual Degradation' as
Part of the Treatment, FRESNO BEE, June 30, 1993, at A6; Carol Ness & Stephanie
Salter, Therapists Unsettled by Memory Verdict, S.F. EXAMINER, May 15, 1994, at Al;
Bill Ordine, Seeking Help and Finding Anguish to Some Ex-Cients, It's Therapy
Gone Awry, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 27, 1994, at Al; False-Memory Verdict Meant to
Put Therapists on Notice, ARz. REPUB., May 15, 1994, at A3. The Foundation has
been highly effective in marketing its views. See, e.g., Eugene L. Meyer, Poisoned
Memories., WASH. POST, May 27, 1994, at Dl; Clark Morphew, The Real Tragedy Is
That the Cardinal Was Accused at All, ST. PAUL PIONEER, Nov. 20, 1993, at 9C;
Stephanie Salter, She Accused Her Father, Took It Back, Imagined Incest: Woman
Says Her Therapists Pushed Her to Believe in an 'Awful' Past That Never Was, S.F.
EXAMINER, April 6, 1993, at Al; Edward Walsh, Man Who Accused Cardinal
Bernardin of Sexual Abuse Drops Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1994, at A3.
11. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 4, at 90-93 (noting increase in MPD in urban North
America). Studies of inpatient populations on acute psychiatric wards in state mental
hospitals have shown high frequencies of MPD, ranging between 1% and 9%. See Lucy
G. Quinby & Frank W. Putnam, Dissociative Symptoms and Aggression in a State
Mental Hospital, 4 DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 21, 21
(1991); see also Eugene L Bliss & E. Alan Jeppsen, Prevalence of Multiple Personali-
ty Among Inpatients and Outpatients, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 250, 251 (1985); Colin
A. Ross et al., The Prequency of Multiple Personality Disorder Among Psychiatric
Inpatients, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1717 (1991). Outpatient population studies have also
shown significant rates of occurrence. See Colin A. Ross, Epidemiology of Multiple
Personality Disorder and Dissociation, 14 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 503, 506,
511 (1991). These outpatient studies report percentages as high as 15% in studies
involving sexually abused patients. See Donald W. Schafer, Recognizing Multiple Per-
sonality Patients, 40 A. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 500, 502 (1986). Prison population studies
lend further support to the belief MPD is far from rare. See Eugene L. Bliss & Ester
M. Larson, Sexual Criminality and Hypnotizability, 173 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DIS-
EASE 522 (1985); see also Dorothy 0. Lewis & Jennifer S. Bard, Multiple Personality
and Forensic Issues, 14 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 741, 755 (1991); Jiri Modestin,
less, three things are clear: witnesses carrying this diagnosis are now
appearing in courtrooms around the country, 2 these witnesses are
markedly different from other witnesses, 3 and lawyers and judges
Multiple Personality Disorder in Switzerland, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 88 (1992); Elyn
R. Saks, Does Multiple Personality Disorder Exist? The Beliefs, the Data, and the
Law, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 43, 45-70 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Bill Romano, Multiple Personalities Testify in Abuse Trial, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 15, 1993, at 113; Janny Scott, Disorder in the Court: When Men-
tal Illness Meets the Law-Multiple Personality Defendants Pose Daunting Challeng-
es, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), May 10, 1994, at 4A. Most of the suits have
involved allegations of sexual abuse, usually against primary childhood caretakers.
See, e.g., State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 90 (Mont. 1990) (involving sexual abuse by
step-father), overruled on other grounds by State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991);
Abuse Memories-True or False?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 19, 1993, at Al; Alan J.
Craver, Multiple Personality Girl Testifies Against Father: Harford Judge is Told of
Years of Sex Abuse, BALT. MORNING SUN, Feb. 13, 1992, at IC; Gay Elwell, Jury Dead-
locks in Sex Abuse Case, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Sept. 15, 1994, at B5; Eu-
gene L. Meyer, Mistrial Called in Sexual Abuse Case of Daughter with Personality
Disorder, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1993, at D6 [hereinafter Mistrial]; Eugene L Meyer,
Woman with Multiple Personality Testifies in Abuse Trial, WASH. POST, Aug. 21,
1993, at D1 [hereinafter Woman]. In addition to primary caretakers, therapists, high
school counselors, priests, and others, have also been sued. See, e.g., College Hosp.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (therapist),
rev'd, 882 P.2d 894 (1994); Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 226 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(high school counselor); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 626 (Okla. 1992) (priest);
Birkner v. Flowers, 771 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1989) (social worker in mental hospi-
tal). The suits often involve bizarre twists or come to surprise endings. See, e.g.,
Charles Babington, The Uncivil Suit in Montgomery County, A Strange Sexual Ha-
rassment Case Finally Goes to Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1992, at Cl; Jane Harper,
Trial Takes Twist with Multiple Personalities, HOUSTON POST, Sept. 13, 1992, at Al;
Knight, supra note 10, at A6; Mistrial, supra at D6; Bill Rankin, A Case of Multiple
Personalities: A Shattered Victim Sentencing this Week in Bizarre Rape Case, ATLAN-
TIC CONST., June 7, 1992, at D1; Lisa Popyk, Woman With Mental Disorder Accuses
Driver of Sexual Assault, CIN. POST, Oct. 5, 1994, at 9A; Salter, supra note 10, at Al;
Woman Alleges 10 Personalities, Sexual Attack, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 6, 1994, at
C6.
Several trials have involved accusations of satanic ritual abuse (SRA). See, e.g.,
Henry Chu, Suit Claiming Satanic Abuse Nearing the Jury, LA. TIMES, Apr. 11,
1991, at 137; Sonni Efron & Henry Chu, Jury Splits Verdict in Cult Trial, LA. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1991, at Al; Sonni Efron, Witness Denies Defense Allegation in Cult Case,
LA. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, at B8; Diane Klein, Plaintiffs Speak the Unspeakable, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1991, at El. This is not surprising since a large percentage of patients
with this disorder believe they were satanically abused in childhood. See, e.g., Rich-
ard P. Kluft, Phenomenology and Treatment of Extremely Complex Multiple Personal-
ity Disorder, 1 DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIvE DISORDERS 47, 50 (1989);
Sonni Efron, Expert Tells of Finding Some Physical Signs of Satanic Child Abuse,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1991, at B1; Larry Witham, Satanic Ritual Abuse: Modern Horror
or Hoax? Credibility of 'Survivors' Is Under Attack, WASH. POST, June 15, 1994, at
A9.
13. The appearance of multiples on the witness stand raises a number of novel
and complex medico-legal issues. How many oaths are necessary? "Who" should the
[Vol. 23: 387, 1996] Witnesses With Multiple Personality Disorder
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have no idea what to make of them.'4
The advent of witnesses with this disorder began five years ago in
Oshkosh, Wisconsin, when a young woman, identified only as "Sarah,"
told a jury how Mark Peterson, a man she barely knew, had taken sexu-
al advantage of her by seducing "Jennifer," a naive and compliant part
of her personality.'" Sarah had somewhere between eighteen and forty-
six personality states. Six emerged to testify.'" The chaos inside
Sarah's mind dominated the trial. The judge administered new oaths
and made new introductions each time Sarah switched. 7 As "Franny,"
Sarah related how she and three others, "John," "Jammie," and
"Jennifer," had gone fishing the night she met the accused. As
"Jennifer," Sarah described how the accused enticed her into "coming
out" and seduced her. As mischievous six-year-old "Emily," Sarah
vouched for Jennifer's testimony, confessing that she had been curious
about what was going on and had "peeked" during the sexual encoun-
judge evaluate for competency and when should this evaluation take place? See infra
part II. How does an attorney cross-examine a witness with a dissociatively compart-
mentalized mind? See infra part IV. Can this disorder impact a multiple's perception
and recall? See infra part V. Can psychotherapy alter a multiple's memory? See infra
parts VI, VIL
14. For some of the issues courts are now struggling with, see Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d
at 224, and Thornton v. State, 653 N.E.2d 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In Dorsey, the
court was asked to decide: (1) whether a trial judge should determine a multiple's
testimonial competence based on an evaluation of the witness's whole personality be-
fore the start of the testimony or separately as to each alter as and when it emerges
and (2) whether a witness who needs to enter an altered state of consciousness to
remember what happened is competent to testify. Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d at 226-29; see
also Scott, supra note 12, at 4A (surveying current trends and developments in the
criminal field in cases involving multiples). In Thornton, the court considered a chal-
lenge to testimonial competence based on the witness having undergone memory
integration therapy. Thornton, 653 N.E.2d at 496.
15. For a legal analysis of this trial, see generally Joann Ondrovik & David Hamil-
ton, Credibility of Victims Diagnosed as Multiple Personality: A Case Study, 9 AM.
J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL 13 (1991).
16. For media accounts of this trial, see Carol J. Castaneda, Multiple-Personality
Case: Guilty, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 1990, at 3A; Cynthia Gorney, Man Guilty in Mul-
tiple Personality Rape Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1990, at Cl; Cynthia Gorney,
Sarah's Story: Voices from a Fractured Past-Wisconsin Woman Describes the Ori-
gin of Her Selves, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1990, at Dl; Robert Imrie, Woman's Illness
is a Roadblock in Oshkosh Trial, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 17, 1990, at 1E; Man
Guilty in Sex Assault on Woman with 46 Identities, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at
A20; Desda Moss, Personalities Case is Closed, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1990, at 2A;
Multiple-Personalities Case Retrial Ordered, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1990, at BI.
17. See supra note 16 (listing media accounts of the trial).
ter. Spectators fought for seats and watched with curious amazement as
Sarah switched identities. The jury found Mark Peterson guilty, but the
judge set the verdict aside and ordered a new trial. 8 The case was nev-
er retried.'9
Witnesses like Sarah are now appearing in other American court-
rooms." Their presence is a natural consequence of the increased use
of the MPD diagnosis. However, this is not the only factor at work. For
many multiples, life is a series of calamities beginning in early child-
hood2' and continuing into adult life.22 Memory compartmentalization
18. The judge's ostensible reason for ordering a new trial was that the defense
.had not properly pursued its request for a compulsory psychological examination of
the victim. See Multiple Personalities Case Retrial Ordered, supra note 16, at B1.
Shortly before the judge set the verdict aside, however, a key prosecution witness
publicly admitted that he had been sexually involved with Sarah. See New Questions
Raised in Wisconsin Rape Case, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1990, at C3. Whether this admis-
sion played a role in the judge's decision to order a new trial is unclear.
19. The prosecution requested a dismissal because Sarah was too fragile to with-
stand the ordeal of a second trial. See No Retrial of Man in Wisconsin Rape, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1990, at B17. The trial took its toll on Sarah; she is now reputed to
have 72 personalities and spends much of her life in state mental hospitals. See
Cathryn Creno, Disorder Splits Her into 72 Personalities: Experts Debate Whether
Illness Is a Fad or Real, ARiz. REPUBLIC, July 10, 1992, at B1; Woman With Multiple
Personality Disorder Continues Care Outside Institution, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Feb. 25, 1993, at 2C. The prosecutor has been accused of bringing this case to trial
for political gain. See ArLynn L. Presser, Publicity and Justice: Rape Conviction
Overturned Amid Allegations of Prosecutorial Impropriety, 77 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1991, at
20.
20. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
21. The overwhelming majority of patients diagnosed with MPD provide histories of
severe abuse in childhood. PUrNAM, supra note 1, at 45-54. In the NIMH study of 100
patients, 97% reported being abused. Id. Sexual abuse was the type of abuse most
often mentioned and was reported by 68% of the patients. Id. at 47. Findings of high
incidents of abuse are standard across all published studies. See supra note 3.
22. Studies show that people who were sexually abused as children carry a much
higher risk of being victimized as adults. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 69-70; see, e.g.,
BRIERE, supra note 6, at 20-21; Richard P. Kluft, Dissociation and Subsequent Vulner-
ability: A Preliminary Study, 3 DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISoR-
DERS 167, 167 (1990); Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Compulsion to Repeat the Trau-
ma, Re-enactment, Revictimization, and Masochism, 12 PSYCIATPC CLINICS OF N.
AM. 389, 391 (1989). More than half of the subjects in a NIMH study of 100 MPD
patients reported being sexually assaulted or raped as adults. See PUTNAM, supra note
1, at 69. Studies show that incest victims are twice as likely as others to enter into
physically violent marital relationships and to receive unwanted sexual advances from
authority figures. See, e.g., van der Kolk, supra, at 391.
Several hypotheses have been offered to explain this tendency. Dr. Putnam views
the tendency of multiples to enter into abusive relationships in adult life as an at-
tempt to obtain belated mastery over the original trauma by unconsciously reenacting
it. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 178-80. Drs. Bloch and Kluft assert that dissociative
memory barriers prevent multiples from recalling their past experiences and trans-
[Vol. 23: 387, 1996] Witnesses With Multiple Personality Disorder
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keeps crucial information out of awareness.' As a result, multiples are
unable to learn from their prior experiences, fail to recognize danger
signs, and are often victimized over and over again. Further, trauma
takes its toll on memory; the more terrible the trauma, the more terri-
ble the toll. And so it is with multiples.24 Determining truth from a
multiple's testimony, consequently, will not be easy for juries.25
forming them into experiential learning. Id.; see JAMES P. BLOCH, ASSESSMENT AND
TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER AND DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 5-7, 9-11
(1991); Kluft, supra, at 168-71; see also infra note 23. As a result, multiples do not
recognize danger signs and have a tendency to repeat the same mistakes.
23. Psychological development depends upon the continuous "metabolism" of expe-
rience. Psychological metabolism is analogous to the digestive and metabolic process-
es by which a person takes in and utilizes chemical nutrients as fuel for the body.
The process involves an organized sequence that starts with sensory registration of
stimulus events and moves through perceptual/cognitive processing, association with
stored information from other experiences, emotional response to the material, and
learning via adjustment of prior expectations, responses, and behavioral repertoires.
This associative, integrative psychological processing of experience leads to, among
other results, the developmental elaboration of modulated, "mature" emotional states,
the progressive resolution of old problems, and proceeding to new experience. Disso-
ciated psychological functioning in childhood interferes with these processes, leaving
significant gaps in organized memory. See BLOCH, supra note 22, at 5-7, 9-11.
24. See infra part V.
25. This Article is concerned with problems the legal system will face in adjusting
to witnesses with MPD and does not address the related question of criminal trial
competence. For a discussion of competency of multiples in criminal trials, see gener-
ally Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), and Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44
(1987) (holding the right to testify in one's own behalf is protected by due process).
MPD can hamper the defense of criminal charges in a number of different ways: the
accused may have difficulty remembering the events surrounding the crime or recall-
ing childhood experiences needed to substantiate insanity defenses and other pleas
for leniency. Additionally, MPD can affect the accused's trust in his attorney, and his
ability to maintain a continuous psychological presence during the trial and to per-
form other tasks necessary to his defense, such as giving effective testimony. See
generally David B. Savitz, The Legal Defense of Persons with the Diagnosis of Multi-
pie Personality Disorder, 3 DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS
195, 198-200 (1990) (examining factors to determine if the accused is competent to
proceed); Sarah K Fields, Note, Multiple Personality Disorder and the Legal System,
46 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L 261, 280-81 (1994) (discussing the problems with
MPD witnesses). Despite this serious range of potential impairments, judges have
been slow to find multiples incompetent for trial. See, e.g., State v. Badger, 551 A.2d
207, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (upholding trial competence even though
defendant who suffered MPD could not recall the crime). The explanation perhaps
lies in the long and uncertain treatment process that would be necessary to restore
competence once its absence is acknowledged. There are no quick psychopharmaco-
logical cures for MPD. See, e.g., Richard J. Loewenstein, Rational Psychopharmacolo-
The main focus of legal discourse on MPD has centered on whether
multiples should be regarded as singular or plural for legal purposes.26
The clinical community has long since settled this debate for clinical
purposes. Identities are not regarded as separate psychological
persons." While the clinical community's views on personhood do not
bind the legal system, the legal system should not borrow trouble
where none exists by recognizing more than one legal person per body.
Continuing this debate is a waste of time when important issues need
to be addressed. MPD is accompanied by clinical features that defy
common assumptions about consciousness, memory and behavior.
Workable solutions to MPD-related legal issues will need to take these
clinical features into account. Instead of fighting over how many legal
persons inhabit a multiple's body, legal investigators should seek to
determine how this disorder is likely to impact a multiple's performance
in various legal settings and what can be done to compensate.
This Article is written on the assumption that multiples are compe-
tent witnesses and that courts will receive their testimony. This as-
sumption conforms with the modem philosophy of the Federal Rules of
Evidence" and is the approach some courts are now taking.29 Working
gy in the Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder, 14 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N.
AM. 721, 727 (1991). The only known treatment with any chances of success is inten-
sive, long-term psychotherapy. Forensic hospitals are poorly equipped to provide this
treatment. Kort v. Carlson, 723 P.2d 143, 149-50 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (involving
complaint by prisoner with MPD alleging ineffective treatment); State v. Soutamire,
602 So. 2d 564, 567-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that particular hospitals may
provide better treatment for MPD than others). Finding a multiple mentally incompe-
tent for trial would often mean the charges would never come to trial.
26. Compare Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsi-
bility, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 383 (1992) (arguing that alters are, in a philosophical
sense, separate people) with Ralph Slovenko, Commentary, The Multiple Personality:
A Challenge to Legal Concepts, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 681 (1989) (pointing out the
mind-boggling problems that would arise from recognizing more than one legal person
per body).
27. They are viewed within the clinical community as dissociated self-states that
embody "highly stylized enactments of inner conflicts, drives, memories, and feelings."
Ross, supra note 4, at 109; see also infra notes 37, 61, 64, 75, 90 and accompanying
text. Multiples experience their dissociated self-parts as separate, real people. This
belief, however, has been called a delusion by some scholars. See, e.g., Ross, supra
note 4, at 109. Others identify the belief as a temporary psychosis. See, e.g., George
G. Greaves, A History of Multiple Personality Disorder, in CINICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 355, 375 (Richard P. Kluft & Catherine G. Fine eds.,
1993).
28. Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence eliminates mental qualifications for
testifying. FED. R. EVID. 601. This conforms to the position advocated by Dean
Wigmore who argued that clear lines do not exist between mental disorders that
ought to disqualify and those that only impair credibility. 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE § 501, at 709 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). Dean Wigmore further argued that it is
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better to allow juries to hear everyone's testimony, for whatever that testimony is
worth, than to exclude what might be the only witness to an event. See 2 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAS AT COMMON LAW § 501, at 719 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). A
majority of states have witness competence statutes patterned after Rule 601. See 3
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 601[6], at 60141
to 601-65 (1992) (listing states having statutes similar to FRE 601). For a discussion
of the modern approach to witness competence, see generally Michael D. Ermert,
Mental Disorder in Witnesses: An Overview of Competency and Credibility, 41 ALk.
L. REv. 167 (1989), and Michael Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of
Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CAL. L. REV. 648 (1960).
Elimination of competency requirements does not mean, however, that judges are
stripped of power to reject the testimony of witnesses who are so impaired that it
would be a waste of the jury's time to listen to them. This power continues to exist
under 'several different rules of evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 603 (granting judges
the authority to exclude the testimony of witnesses who are incapable of compre-
hending or taking an oath); FED. R. Evin. 602 (granting judges the authority to ex-
clude the testimony of witnesses who are so out of touch with reality that they can-
not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement). This power has also been recog-
nized by some courts. See, e.g., United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1069 (6th Cir.
1993) (discussing courts' ability to exclude testimony if a witness's behavior indicates
a lack of personal knowledge), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994). Moreover, judges
retain the power to exclude the testimony of witnesses who lack what Weinstein and
Berger call "minimum credibility," so that no reasonable jurors could believe them.
See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra, 601[01], at 601-9 to 601-11. This power is de-
rived from Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, allowing the court the power
to reject irrelevant testimony, and Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, allow-
ing the court to exclude testimony if the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the
evidence's probative value. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201-03 (5th
Cir. 1984) (excluding post-hypnotic identification where hypnotism was "unduly sug-
gestive"); Ivy v. State, 522 So. 2d 740, 742 (Miss. 1988) (finding child witness com-
petent under Rule 601, but acknowledging that judge still makes relevancy determina-
tion); State v. Beachum, 643 P.2d 246, 252 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (deciding that post-
hypnotic memories are only admissible when hypnotism was properly performed and
not suggestive), cert. quashed by 644 P.2d 1040 (1982); State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,
1218 (Utah 1987) (stating that Rule 403 may be proper grounds for excluding testimo-
ny of child witness), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra,
601[04]; see also State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1220-21 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J.,
concurring & dissenting) (stating that admission of post-hypnotic testimony should be
determined by balancing probative value and unfair prejudice), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1018 (1990). Despite residual powers, modern courts rarely exclude the testimony of
mentally disordered witnesses, even when those witnesses are seriously impaired. See,
e.g., Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1068-69 (finding witness suffering from confusion, agitation,
paranoia, and hallucinations competent); Richardson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 557, 559
(Ark. Ct App. 1991) (finding witness with IQ between 45-50 competent); State v.
Brown, 400 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (finding witness suffering from
Down's Syndrome competent); State v. Brovold, 477 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (finding three year-old witness competent), denial of habeas corpus affd by
on this assumption, this Article examines the various ways MPD can
impact the performance of a witness." This disorder can have a global
impact,3' impairing the capacity to receive accurate memory impres-
sions," to recollect' and communicate the impressions to others,'
and to comprehend the obligations of an oath.' Lawyers and judges
will need to understand the limitations of a person with MPD in order
Brovold v. Erickson, 27 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994).
29. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 228-29 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Thornton
v. State, 653 N.E.2d 493, 500-01 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89,
94-95 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979
(Mont. 1991).
30. The phrase "witnesses with MPD" carries the misleading suggestion that all
witnesses with this disorder will be alike. Multiples, like witnesses suffering from any
other emotional disturbance, will be impaired in varying degrees. They will run the
gamut from people who hold down responsible jobs and practice professions to peo-
ple who are unable to function. See generally Richard P. Kluft, High-Functioning
Multiple Personality Patients: Three Cases, 174 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 722
(1986) (discussing case histories of two physicians and a research scientist with
MPD). Multiple personality disorder is not incompatible with success in life. One-fifth
of the patients (20/100) in Dr. Frank Putnam's NIMH study held advanced degrees.
See PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 101.
The impact of this disorder on the performance of a witness is likely to vary,
both with the witness's functional impairment and with the issues involved in the
case. MPD will have its greatest impact in trials involving shocking incidents. This is
because the underlying event will have been experienced in a dissociative state. See
infra part II. Dissociation is a major cause of the problems upon which this Article
focuses. Similar problems are unlikely to arise at trials involving emotionally neutral
experiences. At such trials, the witness's disorder is unlikely to have an appreciable
impact either on the accuracy of the witness's recall or on the witness's courtroom
demeanor.
31. Despite their serious impairments, multiples will make surprisingly convincing
witnesses. They have the uncanny ability to convert people they have just met into
their defenders and champions. Their powers of persuasion are evidenced by the fact
that 8896 of therapists who treat patients with this disorder believe their patients' sto-
ries of satanic ritual abuse. See Nancy E. Perry, Psychotherapists' Experiences of the
Effects of Working with Dissociative Disorders Patients 4 (1992) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with Trauma Disorders Institute, Milwaukee, Wisconsin). This is true
even when the stories are improbable and go against the findings of law enforcement
agencies. See, e.g., Kenneth V. Lanning, Ritual Abuse: A Law Enforcement View or
Perspective, 15 CHmD ABUSE & NEGLECT 171, 172-73 (1991); Witham, supra note 12, at
A9; 'Recovered Memory' In Doubt: Study Uncovers No Clear Evidence of Abuse by
Cults, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 1994, at C3.
32. See infra part V.
33. Particular information may be available only if the witness is in the correct
state. This will create the need to call out different identities. See infra Part IV. The
identity-state dependency of a multiple's recall will place the defense at a disadvan-
tage since the defense is unlikely to know which states exist, much less which ones
house the desired memories.
34. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
35. See infra part III.
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to exercise sound judgment on the many issues that may arise when a
multiple takes the witness stand.'
I. FROM TRAUMA, DISSOCIATION, AND SPONTANEOUS
SELF-HYPNOTISM TO MULTIPLE
PERSONALITY DISORDER
Multiple personality disorder is a "dissociative disorder."37 Dissocia-
36. This Article is concerned with the problems inherent in the testimony of wit-
nesses with this disorder, rather than with the emotional fragility these witnesses may
display. The stressful demands of the courtroom and of cross-examination may at
times be overwhelming, necessitating protective measures to facilitate testimony. On
the constitutionality of using protective measures with adult witnesses, see generally
Lisa H. Thielmeyer, Beyond Maryland v. Craig: Can and Should Adult Rape Victims
Be Permitted to Testify by Closed-Circuit Television?, 67 IND. L.J. 797 (1992). In
fixing trial dates, judges should keep in mind that postponing proceedings to allow
additional time for treatment may make trials less stressful on everyone.
37. The "dissociative disorders" are a group of five disorders characterized by dis-
turbances of consciousness, perception, identity, or memory. See DSM IV, supra note
9, §§ 300.6, 300.12-300.15, at 477-81. These disorders include: (1) multiple personality
disorder (characterized by the presence of two or more identities and an inability to
recall important personal information too extensive to be explained by ordinary for-
getfulness); (2) dissociative amnesia (characterized by loss of memory for important
personal information, usually brought on by traumatic stress); (3) dissociative fugue
(characterized by the sudden, unexpected travel away from home, loss of memory for
important personal information, and confusion about identity); (4) depersonalization
disorder (characterized by persistent feelings of being disconnected from mind or
body); and (5) dissociative disorders not otherwise specified (characterized by disso-
ciative disturbances of identity or memory not within any of the other four diagnostic
categories). For a discussion of the various disorders, see DSM-IV, supra note 9, at
§§ 300.14 (Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly MPD)), 300.12 (Dissociative Amne-
sia), 300.13 (Dissociation Fugue), 300.6 (Depersonalization Disorder), 300.15 (other
dissociative disorders). MPD is the most serious of the five dissociative disorders.
In the American Psychiatric Association's latest Diagnostic Manual, DSM-IV,
which came out in 1994, MPD was renamed. Its new name is "dissociative identity
disorder." See infra note 61. The name change was made to emphasize that multiples
have only one personality, which is dissociatively fragmented, rather than multiple
personalities. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 12, at 4A Although the new name contains
a better description of this disorder, this Article will continue using the old one be-
cause lawyers are more familiar with it.
There is a vast and growing literature on MPD. For listings, see generally
CAROLE GOETrMAN ET AL., MULTILE PERSONALITY AND DISSOCIATION, 1791-1990: A CoM-
PLETE BIBLIOGRAPHY (1991) (available through George B. Greaves); MOSHE S. TOREM,
MULTIPLE PERSONALITY, DISsOcIATIvE STATES, AND TRAUMAInc STRESS DISORDERS: A BIB-
LIOGRAPHY FOR ADDITIONAL READING (2d ed. 1990) (available through Akron General
Medical Center). For comprehensive clinical treatments, see generally Buss, supra
tion alters the way experiences are represented in awareness and
stored in memory."8 An experience has four major components:
thoughts, behaviors, emotions, and physical sensations.39 In normal
mental functioning, all four components are processed in awareness
and stored in memory as a unit. Dissociation involves a break in the
normal associative processing of experiential data. During dissociative
episodes, components of an experience or the entire experience be-
come separated from the main stream of consciousness and are pro-
cessed outside awareness." If parts of an experience are dissociated,
the experience will have a distorted or unreal quality; thoughts, feelings,
emotions, sensations, or behaviors that normally are present will be
missing.4' If the entire experience is dissociated, it will not be regis-
note 4, at 193-220; BLOCH, supra note 22, at 43-81; CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MULTI-
PLE PERSONALITY DISORDER, supra note 27; PUTNAM, supra note 1; ROss, supra note 4;
Richard P. Kluft, The Dissociative Disorders, in TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 557, 569-79
(J. A. Talbott et al. eds., 1988); John C. Nemiah, Dissociative Disorders (Hysterical
Neurosis, Dissociative Type), in 1 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 942 (Har-
old I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 4th ed. 1985).
38. For a theoretical treatment of dissociation, see generally SINGER, supra note 1,
and ERNEST R. HILGARD, DIVIDED CONSCIOUSNESS: MULTIPLE CONTROLS IN HUMAN
THOUGHT AND ACTION (1977). For an explanation of how dissociation works to defend
the psyche against trauma, see BLISS, supra note 4, at 164-92; BLOCH, supra note 22,
at 1-11; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 6-23; Bennett G. Braun, BASK Model of Dissocia-
tion (pts. 1 & 2), in I DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 4
(1988) (Part 1), and in 2 DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 16
(1988) (Part II) [hereinafter collectively Braun, BASK]; Bennett G. Braun, Psychothera-
py of the Survivor of Incest With A Dissociative Disorder, 12 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF
N. AM. 307, 307-12 (1989) [hereinafter Braun, Survivor of Incest]; Frank W. Putnam,
Jr., Dissociation as a Response to Extreme Trauma, in CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS OF
MULTIPLE PERSONALITY 66 (Richard P. Kluft ed., 1985) [hereinafter Putnam, Dissocia-
tion]; David Spiegel, Dissociation, Double Binds, and Posttraumatic Stress in Multi-
ple Personality Disorder, in TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 61 (B.
Braun ed., 1986) [hereinafter Spiegel, Double Binds].
39. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 1-11; Braun, BASK, supra note 38, at 4-9;
Kanovitz, supra note 2, at 1205-07.
40. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 1-21; HILGARD, supra note 38, at 216-24,
242-56; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 12-23; ROSS, supra note 4, at 86-90; Braun, BASK,
supra note 38, at 5; Braun, Survivor of Incest, supra note 38, at 307-12.
41. Dissociation is a common response to trauma. Trauma victims often experience
memory blackouts, emotional detachment, lack of responsiveness, time distortions,
physical numbness, feelings of estrangement from body, uncertainty whether the ex-
perience is real or a dream, and similar alterations of reality while the event is in
progress. These alterations are due to dissociation. See, e.g., Catherine Classen et al.,
Trauma and Dissociation, 57 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 178 (1993); Kanovitz, supra
note 2, at 1204-09; David Spiegel, Hypnosis in the Treatment of Victims of Sexual
Abuse, 12 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 295, 295-99 (1989) [hereinafter Spiegel, Vic-
tims of Sexual Abuse]; David Spiegel & Etzel Cardena, Disintegrated Experience: The
Dissociative Disorders Revisited, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 366, 369-70 (1991). Disso-
ciation disorganizes the experience, causing components to be processed outside
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tered in consciousness and amnesia will result.
4 2
Dissociation is a common occurrence in everyday life. It is brought
on by intense absorption. Intense absorption can block awareness of
thoughts, feelings, sensation, and behaviors one is then experiencing.
Driving a car while lost in thought is an example. 3 Absorption of the
conscious part of the mind in reflection crowds the fact that one is
driving out of awareness. The car seems to travel on its own. However,
this is not the case. Another part of the mind is attending to this chore.
Because driving has been dissociated and carried on outside awareness,
memories of the trip are not accessible to normal recall.'
Dissociation also has adaptive functions. It can cushion psychological
blows by preventing unbearable experiences from being registered in
consciousness.45 The key to disassociation is one's capacity for intense
absorption. 6 People who have a high capacity for intense absorption
can make unbearable experiences "disappear" by concentrating their
attention, redirecting it and intensely focusing it on something else,
such as a pleasant memory, intriguing fantasy, or even a spot on the
wall. For people with this capacity, dissociation takes place like an
automatic reflex action. The total absorption of the conscious part of
the mind in other matters pushes the experience out of awareness and
awareness. The missing components give the rest of the experience a distorted or
unreal quality. Dissociation is also the explanation that accounts for the amnesia that
rape victims, soldiers after battle, and other victims of unbearable ordeals sometimes
report. See, e.g., Putnam, Dissociation, supra note 38, at 72-74. For authorities con-
cerning the process where dissociation works to defend the psyche against trauma,
see supra note 38.
42. See, e.g., David Spiegel, Hypnosis, Dissociation, and Trauma: Hidden and
Overt Observers, in REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONALITY THE-
ORY, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND HEALTH 121 (Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990) [hereinafter
Spiegel, Hypnosis, Dissociation, and Trauma].
43. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 9-10.
44. See, e.g., Spiegel, Hypnosis, Dissociation, and Trauma, supra note 42, at 123-
37 (using computer analogy to explain why information absorbed without conscious
registration is inaccessible to normal recall).
45. See supra notes 38, 41 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Spiegel, Hypnosis, Dissociation, and Trauma, supra note 42, at 121,
124; Spiegel, Victims of Sexual Abuse, supra note 41, at 295-99. For a theoretical
discussion of how dissociation divides consciousness, see generally HiLGARD, supra
note 38.
forces another part of the mind to take over.47 When an experience is
dissociated and carried on outside awareness, amnesia results.
Traumatized children with a capacity for intense absorption learn
that they can make traumatic experiences "disappear." This discovery
starts them on the road to MPD.48 Most people, lost in thought, can
make everyday objects, such as highways and mailboxes, seem to van-
ish. Special cognitive traits are required, however, to make horrors like
incest vanish. The traits necessary to accomplish this feat are usually
found only in people who are highly hypnotizable.49 Dissociative capac-
47. See Spiegel, Hypnosis, Dissociation, and Trauma, supra note 42, at 121; supra
note 46 and accompanying text.
48. For the factors hypothesized as responsible for development of MPD, see su-
pra notes 45-47 and infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
49. Richard J. Lowenstein, Posttraumatic and Dissociative Aspects of Transference
and Countertransference in the Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder, in CLINI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 51, 61 (Richard P. Kluft & Cath-
erine G. Fine, eds., 1993). The link between hypnotic capacity and MPD was discov-
ered in the 19th century. Dr. Richard J. Lowenstein has observed that:
MPD patients ...naturalistically display phenomena homologous to that seen
in highly hypnotizable subjects without MPD studied in research paradigms.
These include intense absorption experiences, spontaneous trances, complex
amnesias, hyperannesia, anesthesias, spontaneous negative hallucinations and
age-regressions, dissociated motor actions, complex multimodal hallucinations
and imagery, out-of-body experiences, hidden observer-like phenomena, and
trance logic. A Spiegel eye-roll frequently accompanies switches in MPD pa-
tients, although this may be difficult to observe because of eyelid closure.
Further, MPD patients usually manifest high scores on standard scales of
hypnotizability.
Id. (citations omitted).
Hypnotic capacity plays a central role in most contemporary theories explaining
the development of MPD. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 9-10; see Bennett G. Braun, Issues
in the Psychotherapy of Multiple Personality Disorder, in TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE
PERSONALITY DISORDER 1, 4-5 (Bennett G. Braun ed., 1986) (citing the use of hypnotic
suggestion); Edward J. Frischholz, The Relationship Among Dissociation, Hypnosis,
and Child Abuse in the Development of Multiple Personality Disorder, in CHIDHOOD
ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 99 (Richard R. KMuft ed., 1985); Doris
Gruenewald, On the Nature of Multiple Personality: Comparison with Hypnosis, 32
INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 170, 171-73 (1984); Frank W. Putnam, Recent
Research On Multiple Personality Disorder, 14 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 489, 498-
99 (1991) [hereinafter Putnam, Recent Research]; Spiegel, Victims of Sexual Abuse, su-
pra note 41, at 298-99. Dr. Eugene Bliss states that:
The crux of the syndrome of multiple personality seems to be the patient's
unrecognized abuse of self-hypnosis. This unintentional misuse seems to be
the primary mechanism of the disorder. The process begins very early in
childhood, and thereafter self-hypnosis becomes the dominant mode of coping
with stress. Unpleasant experiences are henceforth forgotten and delegated to
a personality by the switch into a hypnotic state.
Buss, supra note 4, at 125-26.
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ity and hypnotizability are measurable traits'o that usually go hand-in-
hand." The most widely accepted theory about the origin of MPD pos-
tulates that it develops out of a highly hypnotizable child's recurring
need for psychological flight from trauma 2 Fear causes the child to
Dr. Bliss regards high hypnotic capacity as sufficient by itself to explain the de-
velopment of MPD. Id. Most theorists, however, regard childhood trauma to be a nec-
essary co-ingredient. See infra note 52. Elevated hypnotic capacity and childhood
trauma may themselves be linked. Dr. Josephine Hilgard discovered this relationship
while investigating the childhood backgrounds and personality characteristics of people
who are highly hypnotizable. Childhood trauma turned out to be one of the two stron-
gest predictors of high hypnotic capacity. See JOSEPHINE R. HILGARD, PERSONALITY &
HYPNOSIS: A STUDY IN IMAGINATIVE INVOLVEMENT 207-24, 242-47, 270-87 (2d ed. 1979). Dr.
Hilgard speculates that high hypnotic capacity may develop from an abused child's
need to escape from a harsh reality. Id. at 283-85. Other researchers have replicated
Hilgard's findings suggesting that elevated hypnotic capacity may, for some, represent a
traumatically-induced trait. See, e.g., Kanovitz, supra note 2, at 1208 n.90, 1240. These
findings indirectly validate theories postulating the traumatic origins of MPD. See
Spiegel, Double Binds, supra note 38, at 65; David Spiegel, Multiple Posttraumatic Per-
sonality Disorder, in CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 87, 90-
91 (Richard P. Kluft & Catherine G. Fine eds., 1993).
50. See, e.g., Eve M. Bernstein & Frank W. Putnam, Development, Reliability, and
Validity of a Dissociation Scale, 174 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 727, 732 (1986);
Carlo Piccione et al., On the Degree of Stability of Measured Hypnotizability over a
Twenty-Five Year Period, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL 289 (1989).
51. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 53; Spiegel, Hypnosis, in TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 907, 910 (John A. Talbott et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Spiegel, Hypnosis];
Moshe S. Torem et al., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Dissociation, and
Hypnotizability (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Akron General Medical
Center). Multiples outscore other patient populations on tests measuring both traits.
See, e.g., BLISS, supra note 4, at 123-26; Torem et al., supra.
52. Most experts today believe that the development of MPD requires an interplay
between constitutional and environmental factors. The constitutional factors include
high hypnotic capacity and an easy ability to dissociate. See supra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text. The most widely accepted theory postulates that when a child
with these biological endowments is repeatedly traumatized, she begins using these
endowments to block the trauma from awareness. Multiple personality disorder devel-
ops from this use. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 12-13; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at
45-54; Braun, supra note 49, at 3-8; Bennett G. Braun & Roberta G. Sachs, The De-
velopment of Multiple Personality Disorder: Predisposing, Precipitation, and Perpetu-
ating Factors in CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 38, 42-
52 (Richard P. Kluft ed., 1986); Richard P. Kluft, Clinical Presentations of Multiple
Personality Disorder, 14 PSYCIIIATHIC CLINICS OF N. Am. 605, 610 (1991) [hereinafter
Kluft, Clinical Presentations]; Richard P. Kluft, Treating Children Who Have Multiple
Personality Disorder, in TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 81, 86-89
(Bennett G. Braun ed., 1986) [hereinafter Kluft, Treating Children]; Spiegel, Double
Binds, supra note 38, at 64-66.
undergo a rapid narrowing of attention, precipitating entry into a spon-
taneous, self-hypnotic trance.' The child dissociates and experiences
the trauma inside the trance.' Dissociation offers an efficient solution
for an abused child.5 The child is able to block the experience from
awareness, isolate the memory, and suppress trauma-reactive rage so
that she can continue living with abusive caretakers she is powerless to
Some theorists append a factor or two of their own to the theory of the trau-
matic origins of MPD. Dr. Richard P. Kluft, for example, believes that traumatized
children with these endowments will develop MPD only if they do not receive ade-
quate comforting and soothing to restore normal childhood development. Kluft, Treat-
ing Children, supra, at 87-89. Drs. Braun and Sachs, on the other hand, claim that
the development of MPD requires an inconsistently stressful environment, making it
necessary for the child to fragment in order to keep memories of loving and abusive
interactions separate. Braun & Sachs, supra, at 42-52.
Different hypotheses are also used to explain how highly hypnotizable children
create alter identities. Drs. Braun and Sachs believe that identities develop because
the alter-state memories of abuses become chained together and elaborated upon. Id.
at 49. Dr. Putnam conjectures that traumatized children fantasize imaginary compan-
ions, endow their companions with physical and psychological characteristics, and
then later internalize them. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 53-54; Frank W. Putnam, Disso-
ciative Disorders in Children and Adolescents: A Developmental Perspective, 14 PSY-
CHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 519, 523-24 (1991). These explanations are not necessarily
inconsistent. Highly hypnotizable children may use several recipes for alter creation.
See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 123-26. Hypnosis involves a state of altered
concentration. During hypnosis, the subject's attention becomes intensely concentrated
and focused, causing a decrease in peripheral awareness. See, e.g., Spiegel, Hypnosis,
supra note 51, at 908. Highly hypnotizable subjects are able to lose themselves when
they undergo hypnosis. The physical world vanishes and the mental world is all that
exists. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 66-67; HLGARD, supra note 38, at 160.
Hypnosis is not a spell cast on the subject by the hypnotist; it is an innate
capacity. The hypnotist merely acts as a facilitator, aiding the subject to relax, con-
centrate, and focus attention. Once this happens, the subject's natural capacities take
over. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 70. People vary in the degree to which they
are capable of sustaining hypnosis. See, e.g, HILGARD, supra note 38, at 155-62. Sub-
jects who are highly hypnotizable do not need the help of a hypnotist to undergo
trance. They can spontaneously self-hypnotize by gazing at a spot on the wall, staring
at a light, or looking too long in a pond; anything that causes their attention to be-
come overly concentrated and focused can bring on hypnosis. See, e.g., Buss, supra
note 4, at 69-78.
54. Dr. David Spiegel conceptualizes the process as being in the nature of a chain
reaction: trauma causes a rapid narrowing of focus, the narrowing of focus triggers a
spontaneous self-hypnotic trance, and this, in turn, leads to dissociation. See, e.g.,
Spiegel, Victims of Sexual Abuse, supra note 41, at 296-97.
55. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 13; ELIANA GIL, TREATMENT OF ADULT SURVI-
VORS OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE 149 (2d ed. 1990); PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 53 (noting the
use of dissociation as an escape). The gains, however, are purely over the short term
and are received at the expense of chronic memory disturbance and the loss of a
cohesive sense of self. Kluft, supra note 22, at 168.
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leave.56 The experience is represented in consciousness as, at most, a
puzzling sense of time-loss.1
7
Multiple personality develops in early childhood, a time of intense
imagination when youngsters fantasize about imaginary companions,
guardian angels, and fairies. Rich imaginations allow children to main-
tain elaborate relationships with inanimate objects, such as dolls and
toys.' Once a dissociatively-gifted child realizes that she can make a
terrifying experience vanish, she begins experimenting with her magic,
using it for other purposes.' She discovers that she can conjure play-
mates and go anywhere or be anyone she wants by withdrawing into
her mind. Each time the child dissociates into an altered state, addition-
al memories are added and become state-dependently bound to this
particular state.' These memories gradually accumulate and may even-
tually shape the altered state into a discrete and discriminate identity,'
with its own personality characteristics, life history, and state-depen-
dent memories.' Multiple personality disorder has now begun.
56. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 13.
57. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 74-77. The following question asked on
diagnostic interviews may help the reader understand time-loss: Have you ever experi-
enced "looking at a clock and seeing that it was, say, 9:00 in the morning, and the
next thing you are aware of is that it is, say, 3:00 in the afternoon and you have
absolutely no recollection of what has happened between 9:00 am. and 3:00 p.m.?"
Id. at 74.
58. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 73-78.
59. See, e.g., id. at 70-78; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 54 (noting the creation of
imaginary companions).
60. The child's memories are alter-state-dependent in the sense that the child is
usually able to remember events that took place in an altered state only when the
child is again in that state. The memories are not otherwise accessible to conscious
recall. For a discussion of how memory compartmentalization will affect performance
as a witness, see iqfra part IV.
61. A multiple's self-parts have traditionally been called personalities. This designa-
tion was misleading because it suggested a degree of psychological separateness
greater than that which existed. To clear up this confusion, the American Psychiatric
Association recently renamed the disorder "dissociative identity state" and eliminated
use of term personality in reference to a multiple's self-states. They are now called
"identities" or "personality states." See DSM-IV, supra note 9, at 484; supra note 37.
Multiple personality systems have a "host" state and one or more alternate iden-
tities. The host is the state that is in control most of the time or, in other words,
the multiple's "normal" identity. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 107. The host
state is not necessarily constant over a lifetime. During different periods, different
parts of a multiple's personality can be dominant and, thus, serve as the host. See,
e.g., Braun, supra note 49, at xiii (defining "host").
62. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 27-28; supra note 52 and accompanying
II. How MULTIPLE PERSONALITY SYSTEMS FUNCTION
After the initial split, the child finds identity creation easy, and new
identities are added whenever the child encounters stresses beyond the
ability to cope.' Each alternate identity-state (alter)' is assigned a
fixed set of psychological, physiological, or maintenance tasks to per-
form.' The alters created and the tasks they are assigned are unique to
each personality system. The formation depends on the environmental
stresses and psychological conflicts in the child's life when the system
is configured.' An incestuously abused child might find it necessary to
text. The following description from Drs. Bennett Braun and Roberta Sachs may help
conceptualize how identity states are formed and how they function:
The formation of an alternate personality occurs when a series of fragmented
but defensively related [dissociative] episodes, linked by a common affective
state, take on an identity of their own. This usually happens when the series
of episodes are conceptually related to a particular type of event. At this
point, an analogy between computers and multiple personality disorder be-
comes useful. It is almost as if two memory systems are created. Memory
System "A" contains information that forms the identity of the "host" person-
ality. Memory System "B," which is split off from Memory System "A" con-
tains information which system A was unwilling or unable to integrate. This
information can be centered around a common theme, such as anger toward
authority (parental) figures, developmentally conflicted drives, or opposing
emotions. The structurally organizing theme of these previously fragmented
[dissociative] episodes now gives the new entity an identity and purpose. In
the case of anger toward authority figures, this new personality may pop up
whenever the host personality feels he or she is pushed around by someone
who is perceived as having some control over his or her life ....
Braun & Sachs, supra note 52, at 49.
63. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 27-28; Cornelia B. Wilbur, The Effect of
Child Abuse on the Psyche, in CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY
DISORDER 21, 27-31 (Richard P. Kluft ed., 1985).
64. "Alter" stands both for alternate identity and altered state of consciousness.
When the multiple enters an altered state of consciousness, she experiences herself
as being a different person-hence, the term alternate identity. This belief, however,
is a delusion. A multiple's self-states do not possess the richly textured complexity
and the full range of emotions of a whole person because they are not whole per-
sons. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 132-33. They are dissociated parts of a
multiple's fragmented personality. See supra notes 27, 37, 61 and accompanying text;
infra note 75 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 129-32; BLOCH, supra note 22, at 27-32;
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 103-04, 106-17 (explaining specialized functions of each
alter); Wilbur, supra note 63, at 27-31.
66. Although each personality system is unique, certain identities are more com-
mon than others. Most personality systems include a host that acts as the system's
ambassador to the Newtonian world, child alters that usually have as their primary
function holding memories of childhood traumas, persecutor states that recreate child-
hood abuses by tormenting the host, and protector states that seek to prevent harms,
both from within and without. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 29-30; PUTNAM, SU-
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create a half a dozen or more identities to cope with the psychological
effects of incest. One identity might be needed to house the terrifying
memories, another to protect bodily integrity, a third to discharge rage,
a fourth to contain sexual urges, a fifth to inflict self-punishment, a
sixth to be anesthetic to pain, and so forth.
The host identity is the multiple's normal state and is usually emo-
tionally fragile. 7 The other states, that is, alternate identities, function
to keep stressful thoughts, memories, emotions, and behaviors out of
the host's awareness.' An identity switch usually means that the host
has experienced an emotion such as fear, anger, loneliness, or sexuality,
which is too stressful for the host to endure.' When the host feels
overwhelmed, the state developed to cope with stresses of this type will
automatically "come out" and take control."0 If anger has been delegat-
ed as an emotion too anxiety-provoking for the host to bear and the
host encounters an anger-provoking situation, a switch will take place,
the host will disappear, and the identity in charge of expressing anger
will become dominant. This state will discharge the system's anger
pra note 1, at 106-14 (reviewing specific types of alter personalities).
67. The host state is "normal" both in the sense of being in control most of the
time and in its function of adapting to the external world. The host is unlikely to
play a starring role at trials involving complaints of abuse because, during times of
stress, the host takes refuge inside. The states that take over for the host will be the
ones, though not necessarily the only ones, that will be aware of what happened. See
inrfra notes 71, 77, 98-108 and accompanying text. If the host is also aware, its
knowledge is most likely to come from memories that have been recovered and rein-
tegrated into consciousness through psychotherapy, rather than derived from original
awareness. For methods used to restore dissociated memories, see infra parts VI, VII.
68. See, e.g., Wilbur, supra note 63, at 27-31. Dr. Wilbur discussed a patient who
in her normal state of consciousness had never experienced an angry thought. Id. at
27. Nevertheless, the patient was a very angry person. Id. Her anger had been dele-
gated to an alternate identity so that it could be expressed outside awareness. Id.
69. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 132.
70. The transition from one identity to another, called "switching," involves dissoci-
ation. For the observable physical manifestations accompanying a switch, see infra
notes 117-19 and accompanying text. Untreated multiples usually have very little con-
trol over this process. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 117. A switch automatically
takes place when a multiple encounters a problem that has been delegated to an
alternate identity for management. Id. Idiosyncratic environmental cues, intrapsychic
conflicts, and psychosocial pressures can all act -as triggers. See, e.g., Buss, supra
note 4, at 132; Kiuft, supra note 7, at 573. Stress, however, is the most common
cause of switching. Untreated multiples have difficulty undergoing stress without dis-
sociating. For a discussion of how this problem will complicate cross-examination,
see infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
outside the host's awareness, sparing the host from being in touch with
this intolerably stressful emotion.7'
Alter identities are not separate psychological persons. They are dis-
sociated self-states that take over when it is necessary for the multiple
to execute emotions, thoughts, and behaviors that the multiple is inca-
pable of executing in a normal consciousness state. The multiple's self-
states work together to accomplish all the psychological, physiological,
and maintenance tasks of integrated personalities. 2 Consequently, mul-
tiples are more like, than unlike, other humans." Yet, they differ in one
71. When a switch occurs, the host will cease being conscious of the body's be-
haviors until it comes out again. PUTNAM, supra note 1 at 72-76. Upon "awakening,"
it will experience the intervening period as time-loss. For a description of the sensa-
tion of time-loss, see supra note 57. If the period is extensive, however, the host
may not even have this level of awareness. Lost time may be covered up by confab-
ulating pseudomemories which provide a false sensation of psychological continuity.
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 73; see also infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
For the arriving alter, the situation is similar to being beamed onto the earth
from an alien planet. The newcomer is usually unaware of what was going on prior
to its arrival. Nonetheless, it quickly orients itself and starts interacting with the envi-
ronment. Transitions are usually sufficiently subtle to go unrecognized by untrained
observers.
72. The fact that identity-states manage to come out and take control at the ap-
propriate times indicates that multiples have a central mechanism that monitors the
environment and decides which part of the personality needs to be dominant. See
HILGARD, supra note 38, at 185-256. This awareness provides further evidence that
identity states are parts of a single personality rather than separate people.
73. Courts have had difficulty applying the M'Naghten insanity test to multiples.
See, e.g., State v. Wheaton, 850 P.2d 507, 512 (Wash. 1993) (conceding insufficient
understanding of MPD to formulate a rule on how to apply the M'Naghten test). The
difficulty stems from uncertainty over which state-the perpetrating identity or the
host-must fail to appreciate the criminality of the conduct for a multiple to be con-
sidered insane. For a discussion of various approaches now in use, see Saks, supra
note 26, at 383, 385-86 (arguing that multiples should not be held criminally account-
able for acts performed in altered states because the perpetrating alter and host are,
in a philosophical sense different people). Since the perpetrating identity usually ap-
preciates the criminality of the conduct, while the host state, being oblivious to what
the body is doing, does not, determining where the focus should be placed in evalu-
ating a multiple's criminal responsibility becomes critical. A majority of courts place
the focus on the perpetrating identity's mental state. The multiple is deemed to be
legally sane if the state in control at the time of the act appreciates the criminality
of the conduct. For courts adopting this position, see Kirkland v. State, 304 S.E.2d
561, 564 (Ga. Ct: App. 1983); State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615, 618 (Haw.), appeal
dismissed, and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1078 (1984); Commonwealth v. Roman, 606
N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Mass. 1993); State v. Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1982).
Professor Elyn Saks advocates the opposite view. See Saks, supra note 26, at
426-27. She contends that the host personality and the perpetrator are, in a
philosophical sense, different people and, consequently, that the host should not be
sent to prison for "some else's" crimes. Id. She would find multiples insane as a
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important respect; they have dissociatively disowned aspects of their
own personality. Personality fragmentation results in reduced control
over behavior. 4 A fragmented psyche does not have all of its resources
at its disposal. Dissociative memory barriers wall off traits of character
and learning from prior experience which, in integrated personalities,
are available to counterbalance, offset, and inhibit impulsive feelings
and behaviors. As a result, multiples tend to express their feelings in
pure, unmodulated form.
III. How DELUSIONS OF SEPARATENESS CAN DISTORT
UNDERSTANDING OF AN OATH
Dr. Frank Putnam describes an identity as a "highly discrete state of
consciousness organized around a prevailing affect, sense of self (in-
cluding body image), with a limited repertoire of behaviors and a set of
matter of law for the crimes of alters. Id. at 452-56. See United States v. Denny-
Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1012-15 (10th Cir. 1993) (adopting Professor Saks' view); see also
Mark E. Hindley, Note, United States v. Denny-Shaffer and Multiple Personality Dis-
order: "Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?," 1994 UTAH L. REV. 961, 964
(1994) (urging Utah courts to follow the position of Professor Saks and Denny-
Shaffer).
The majority position and Professor Saks's position make the same mistake.
Both assume that only part of the multiple's mind should be considered in evaluating
criminal responsibility; they disagree on which part. Depending on the part consid-
ered, the resulting treatment is either too lenient or too harsh.
Dr. Eugene Bliss has observed that when an alter assumes control of the body,
the multiple's actions are, during that period, "partially or completely divorced from
judgment, moral mandates, and other factors in memory that ordinarily would func-
tion. A small segment of the mind at these times is directing behavior, while the rest
of the mind is dormant." Buss, supra note 4, at 148. Since multiples do not have
complete access to their moral faculties and judgment when they perform acts in an
altered state, evaluating their criminal responsibility without considering their limita-
tions is potentially unfair. The majority position should, for this reason, be rejected.
However, rejection of the majority position does not lead to the opposite conclusion,
that multiples should bear no responsibility for acts performed in an altered state, as
Professor Saks contends. See Saks, supra note 26, at 452-56.
Evaluations of criminal responsibility should be based on the multiple's entire
personality. Juries should be given broad latitude to consider such factors as the
degree to which other states were aware of the crime, whether the acts were alien
to the multiple's normal character, and any other factors bearing on moral responsi-
bility. Multiples should be held accountable for their actions unless their actions are
so out of character and their awareness and control so slight that attributing them to
the multiple seems arbitrary.
74. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 8-9; Wilbur, supra note 63, at 27-31.
state-dependent memories."75 This definition coincides with objective
reality. It does not, however, coincide with an identity's self-representa-
tion. Identities experience themselves as authentic, real people." They
may or may not be aware that other identities exist,77 but when they
are aware, they experience the "others" as separate from self, as people
who are distinctly "not me."78 Delusions of separateness permit unac-
ceptable thoughts, feelings, emotions, and behaviors to be attributed to
someone else and thus disowned."
The belief that "she" and "I" are different people is often accompa-
nied by the perspective that "I am not responsible for her behavior."'
This perspective can inhibit a multiple's understanding of an oath. A
75. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 103. Dr. Colin Ross describes identity-states as "dis-
sociative packets of behavior" embodying "highly stylized enactments of inner con-
flicts, drives, memories, and feelings." See Ross, supra note 4, at 109; see also supra
notes 27, 64 and infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 9, 27; Gruenewald, supra note 49, at 170-71.
77. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 8; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 107; Kluft,
Clinical Presentations, supra note 52, at 611-16. The average personality system has
approximately thirteen identities. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 39. Broad varia-
tions exist in interpersonality awareness. Some states are aware of no states but
themselves, while others know a great deal more about what is going on in other
parts of the system. Id. at 114-15. In the NIMH study, 85% of the patients had at
least one state that claimed complete knowledge of the names and life histories of
all the others. Id. Multiples have intricate inner worlds in which their identities are
experienced at maintaining complex and elaborate relationships with one another.
Their inner worlds can become so intricate that experts recommend using maps,
charts, and diagrams to keep this information straight. Id. at 210-11.
78. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 9; Ross, supra note 4, at 126. The perspec-
tive that "she" and "I" are different people is often apparent in the way multiples
talk. Many multiples are unable to tell a story in the first person singular if several
states participated. Their accounts are punctuated with references to what "he," "she,"
and "they" were doing, thinking, or saying while "I" was doing this. See, e.g., PUTNAM,
supra note 1, at 84. Shifting self-references may be confusing for jurors. Yet, this
problem is not nearly as serious as the possible impact delusions of separateness can
have on a multiple's ability to understand and obey an oath.
79. Delusions of separateness can be so complete that identities sometimes try to
murder their internal enemies, unaware of the personal consequences. Suicides for
multiples often represent unsuccessful internal homicides. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra
note 1, at 287.
80. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 215; see Ross, supra note 4, at 125-30
(identifying cognitive errors). In the following passage, Dr. Frank Putnam warns that
some alters will even deny being in therapy:
"Don't give me any of that therapy bullshit! She's the patient, not me. I just
bring her here," one alter told me. Some patients will have alters who
steadfastly maintain that they are not in treatment. They will claim that they
do not have any problems and that it is the other personalities (particularly
the host) who are in need of treatment.
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 215.
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normal witness would feel she had observed her oath in answering "no"
to whether she had performed an act she knew her neighbor had per-
formed, and would sense no duty to volunteer information about mat-
ters she was not asked. Nor would such a witness regard it her duty to
correct another witness's testimony, even though she knew the other
had lied. Multiples are at risk of adopting this attitude toward their own
testimony.
To test this theory, the authors posed the following hypothetical to
two individuals suffering from MPD.' Suppose that Identity B invited
someone to the apartment, became frightened and disappeared, leaving
the host behind. The host, finding a stranger in her apartment, assumed
the worst and filed criminal charges of attempted rape.82 If Identity A
knew that Identity B had invited the accused to the apartment, would
Identity A have an obligation to disclose this information to the defense
if asked whether she had invited the accused? One multiple responded
"yes," while the other answered "no." When the multiple answering "no"
was asked whether it would be fair to send an innocent person to pris-
on, she protested, contending that the defendant was not innocent. The
host had experienced the defendant's behavior as an assault. Since
identity B's invitation did not justify the defendant's assault on the host,
there was no reason for identity A to mention this matter in her testi-
mony.
This inquiry, while limited, suggests that some multiples may feel no
greater responsibility for their body's testimony when alternate person-
alities are in control than they would for a total stranger's testimony.
Moreover, they may not be able to appreciate that they are committing
perjury when they withhold known information unless the question is
posed to the "right" identity and is phrased in exactly the "right" way.'
Management of this problem will require meticulous explanation of
the duties of a witness.' The judge should hold a meeting in chambers
81. Telephone interview with Ms. X, a patient diagnosed with MPD (May 3, 1993).
82. This situation is not far-fetched. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
83. Defense attorneys need to keep delusions of separateness in mind when asking
important questions. Critical questions should be asked in several different ways:
"Ms. A, did you invite the accused to your apartment?"
"No."
"Ms. A, to the best of your knowledge, did any other identity invite the ac-
cused?"
"No."
"Ms. A, do you know of any identities who might have additional information
about this matter?"
84. Some multiples are so invested in delusions of separateness that they may be
before the start of the testimony to explain the standards by which the
court will evaluate the witness's compliance with the oath. At this meet-
ing, the judge should make it clear that the legal system does not share
the witness's perspective that identities are people and that the legal
system recognizes only one witness.' As such, all identities will be
held accountable for the witness's testimony. Regardless of how ques-
tions are phrased or which personality state is in control, the witness
will violate the oath if she withholds relevant information then available
to her conscious recall.8
To give this message maximum impact, the judge should use a proce-
dure known as "talking through."7 This procedure is used when thera-
pists want to address the entire personality system.' The judge should
begin by saying something like: "I want all personality states to give me
their full and undivided attention. I expect all states to listen very care-
fully to everything I am going to say." The judge should then carefully
explain the obligations of an oath, making sure that the witness under-
stands that no matter how questions are phrased or which state is out,
unable to grasp the notion that their whole personality is a party to the proceedings.
Those who cannot accept this notion should be disqualified from testifying. Elimina-
tion of testimonial competency requirements has not destroyed the need for capacity
to understand and obey an oath. See supra note 28. The judge should not rely on his
lay intuition to determine whether the witness is capable of understanding an oath.
The court should obtain a psychological evaluation to determine whether the witness
understands that her entire personality system is involved in the proceedings and is
willing to disclose all information available to her conscious recall. This evaluation
will also help the judge prepare for other problems that may lurk ahead.
85. The current practice is to administer the oath anew each time the witness
switches identities. See Fields, supra note 25, at 272 n.78; Castaneda, supra note 16,
at 3A_ Some judges even conduct separate competency evaluations. See, e.g.,* Dorsey
v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 229 n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); see also Fields, supra note 25,
at 273 n.80, 288 (arguing that each state that testifies must meet criteria for testimo-
nial competence). Judges rarely explain why they think these extraordinary precau-
tions are necessary. Making sure that the state testifying is aware of the oath and
feels bound by it is legitimate. See supra note 71. The judge's purpose can equally
be served, however, by reminding each state of the prior oath and asking that state
whether it remains committed. The second approach is superior to the first because
it reinforces the message that the legal system recognizes only one witness.
86. What a multiple is capable of remembering will depend on which state is exec-
utive. See supra notes 60, 67, 71 and accompanying text; infra notes 98-105 and
accompanying text. This will make the determination of whether perjury has been
committed difficult. Criminal responsibility for perjury should not attach unless the
information is available to the witness's conscious recall.
87. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 197-98, 226-27.
88. We do not guarantee that this procedure will be 10096 effective. Yet, there are
no known procedures with any better chance of disseminating information across
personality state lines. The judge may want to investigate the extent to which this
procedure has been successful by asking all states who are listening to identify them-
selves by name.
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the answer must be true, to the best of the witness's knowledge, for all
parts of the witness's personality system. The judge should further
explain that all states are required to listen to the body's testimony and
spontaneously correct any false or mistaken information they hear.
Upon returning to the courtroom, the judge should administer the oath
as follows:
I want all states to give me their full and undivided attention. In a minute I am
going to ask __ (the host) to take this oath:
'I swear for myself and all my states that all testimony given during these
proceedings will be truthful and that all states will listen and correct any in-
accurate or incomplete testimony they hear.."
Are there any states that are unwilling to be bound by this oath? If so, I want you
to speak now. Do I hear any objections?'
The witness has now taken an oath for all of her states. This is the
first step in the oath-procedure. The judge, nevertheless, will need to
reinforce the oath each time the witness switches identities. The reason
is that the emerging state may be unaware of events before it assumed
executive control. There are two ways to reinforce the oath: administer
the oath anew or remind the witness that she is under oath and ask
whether she remains committed. Administering the oath anew treats
each state as a separate person. This contradicts the judge's earlier mes-
sage that the legal system recognizes only one witness who is responsi-
ble for everything the person knows. Consequently, reminding the wit-
ness of her prior oath and asking her to reaffirm it is the proper ap-
proach.
Trial demeanor raises similar considerations. Trial participants should
not pretend that the witness has become a different person when a new
state takes over. Cautions against validating a multiple's delusions of
89. What should the judge do if an identity steps forward in response to the ques-
tion of whether there are any identities who are unwilling to be bound by the host's
oath? The judge should treat the refusal as grounds for disqualification unless the dis-
senter is willing to take an oath on its own. There is no room in our legal system
for witnesses who believe that only a fraction of their personality is involved in a
legal proceeding. See supra notes 28, 83, 84.
90. PuTNAm, supra note 1, at 93, 103, 163; Philip M. Coons, The Diferential Diag-
nosis of Multiple Personality Disorder, 7 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. Am. 51, 53
(1984); see supra notes 27, 61, 64, 75. Any lingering confusion over whether identities
are separate, psychologically whole people is likely to disappear rapidly once DSM-
IV's new terminology takes hold. Under DSM-IV, a multiple's self-parts are no longer
called "personalities." They are called "identities" or "personality states." See supra
notes 37, 61.
separateness are now appearing in clinical literature.9 Dr. Frank Putnam
warns:
It is important to state from the outset that whatever an alter personality is, it is
not a separate person. It is a serious therapeutic error to relate to alter personali-
ties as if they were separate people. Although many alters will emphatically insist
that they are separate people, the therapist must not buy into this delusion of
separateness. The therapist can empathize with each alter's feelings of separation
and each alter's unique perceptions of experiences and events. But the global
message from the therapist should always be that al of the alters constitute a
whole person.'
Dr. Putnam's warning should be used as a guide for courtroom de-
meanor.' How does the warning not to validate delusions of sepa-
rateness translate into standards of behavior?
Multiples should always be called by their "correct" name, which is the
name of their present state." If the witness is in the state she calls
"Jane," she must be addressed as "Jane." Calling her by any other name
will only confuse and anger her. Nonetheless, Jane can be addressed in
two different ways. Compare the attitudes reflected in each of the follow-
ing exchanges:
1. "Jane, 'Ann' testified yesterday that. ....
91. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 103; Ross, supra note 4, at 109. See also Seymour L.
Halleck, Dissociative Phenomena and the Question of Responsibility, 38 INT'L J. CLIN-
IcAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNosIs 298, 306-09 (1990) (arguing that holding multiples ac-
countable for their behavior will enhance goals of treatment).
92. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 103. Dr. Colin A. Ross, another well-known authority,
has echoed the same warning:
The most important thing to understand is that alter personalities are not
people. That might seem obvious, but it is a truth one can lose sight of
during the therapy. Alter personalities are highly stylized enactments of inner
conflicts, drives, memories, and feelings. At the same time they are dissociat-
ed packets of behavior developed for transaction with the outside world.
They are fragmented parts of one person: There is only one person. The
patient's conviction that there is more than one person in her is a dissocia-
tive delusion and should not be compounded by a folie d deux on the part
of the therapist.
Ross, supra note 4, at 109.
93. Refusing to buy into the witness's delusions of separateness has an added
advantage. It reduces the danger that the theatrical features of this disorder will take
over the trial, distracting jurors. On the other hand, lawyers and judges will need to
be flexible. Some witnesses may become confused if treated this way. A psychologi-
cal evaluation will help establish how much reality the witness can tolerate.
94. Multiples will often need to switch states while testifying. See infra notes 96-
104 and accompanying text. Mentioning a state by name and asking to speak to it
will usually facilitate switches. "I would like to speak to the state you call 'Jane.'"
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 91-93 (stating the importance of asking for each alter spe-
cifically).
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2. "Jane, You testified yesterday in the state you call 'Ann'
that...."
The first exchange validates the witness's delusion that she and Ann
are different people. The second exchange, while acknowledging Jane's
perspective, does not agree with it. The questioner asserts the belief that
Jane and Ann are the same person.
Does it matter how the witness is addressed? It might. Telling a multi-
ple she is accountable for everything she knows while, at the same time,
pretending that each identity is a different person sends a double mes-
sage that is confusing. Multiples are used to having people say one thing
and do something else. They respond better when people act in a
straight-forward and consistent fashion. If multiples are accountable for
their testimony on the assumption that all of their states add up only to
one witness, trial participants should treat them this way.
IV. MEMORY COMPARTMENTALIZATION: THE PROBLEM OF
CROSS-EXAMINING WITNESSES WITH
MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER
Cross-examining a multiple will be a challenge even for seasoned attor-
neys." The challenge will come primarily from two features associated
with MPD: memory compartmentalization and switching.'
Multiples have compartmentalized minds. 7 Their powers of recall will
95. See David Hamilton & Joann Ondrovik, Forensic Issues: May I Speak
With . . . ?, 12 ISSMPD NEWS, Feb. 1994, at 10, 10-11, 15 (discussing the problem of
switching and whether the defendant should have the right to speak to parts of the
witness's personality system besides the ones that were called out on direct examina-
tion).
96. For a discussion of the problems memory compartmentalization will introduce,
see infra notes 97-114 and accompanying text. For a discussion of covert switches,
see infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text
97. No one has total access to the information stored in their memory. Something
in the present cognitive/perceptual context must match the stored information to
stimulate retrieval mechanisms. See, e.g., Laird S. Chermak and Fergus I. Craik, The
Effects of Elaboration of Processing at Encoding and Retrieval: Trace Distinctiveness
and Recovery of Initial Context, in LEvELS OF PROCESS IN HuMAN MEMORY 2, 5-7
(Laird S. Chermak & Fergus I. Craik eds., 1977); Norman E. Spear & Christian W.
Mueller, Consolidation as a Function of Retrieval, in MEMORY CONSOLIDATION: PSY-
CHOBIOLOGY OF COGNITION 111 (Herbert Weingartner & Elizabeth S. Parker eds., 1984).
This explains the phenomenon when, for example, a long-forgotten friend comes to
mind when passing someone on the street who, in some way, resembles her. Conse-
quently, even normal witnesses may need a memory trigger.
depend on the state in control when a question is asked.' Memory
compartmentalization results from chronic use of dissociation. When the
host feels overwhelmed, it takes refuge inside and other states take over.
The states "out" during an incident will be the ones, though not neces-
sarily the only ones,' who will know what happened."in An identity
state's memories are normally accessible to a multiple's recall only when
that state resumes executive control.' This means that for effective
cross-examination, counsel will need to know which states were out
during the incident in order to summon them out again.
Memory compartmentalization will place the defense at a tremendous
disadvantage. The extent of the disadvantage can best be explained by
comparing the witness's mind to a computer.' 2 Imagine a computer
with a number of files, one for each identity." Whenever an identity is
Multiples will have significantly greater difficulty retrieving information than oth-
er witnesses, however, because their minds are dissociatively compartmentalized. Each
identity has a separate memory registration system for its own experiences, for those
events that transpire during periods when it is executive. An identity's memories are
normally accessible to a multiple's recall only when that state is again in control. See
iqJfra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
98. When a multiple dissociates into an altered consciousness state, memories of
experiences during previous periods when this state was executive are now accessi-
ble to the multiple's recall. The best explanation for why dissociated memories are
accessible to a multiple's recall only when the altered state in which the memories
were acquired resumes executive control of the body is that memory retrieval is
state-dependent. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; infra notes 185-91 and
accompanying text.
99. Each state will be aware of events that happened during the periods it was
executive. Other states may also be aware; MPD amnesia is complex. It is possible
for several states to be alert and monitoring the environment at the same time, with
or without awareness of each other. See infra note 108.
100. "When a personality assumes the body, any experiences in the real world dur-
ing this period become those of the personality. The personality then has the memo-
ries and feelings generated while he or she is in control." Bliss, supra note 4, at
132; see supra notes 97-99.
101. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
102. See Braun & Sachs, supra note 52, at 49. This metaphor depicts how traumatic
memories are originally stored; it does not consider the impact of psychotherapy.
Psychotherapy strives to break down dissociative memory barriers by promoting mem-
ory sharing across identity lines. Extensive memory work in psychotherapy may have
taken place before the witness's courtroom appearance. The reintegration of dissociat-
ed memories into conscious awareness will be a mixed blessing. While the witness's
delivery will be improved, the quality of the recall may not be. The quality will be
improved only if the composite restored memory is faithful to the original experience.
See infra parts VI, VII (discussing the problems of reassembling dissociated memories
and reintegrating them into consciousness).
103. See Braun & Sachs, supra note 52, at 49. The average personality system has
slightly more than 13 identities. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 39. The numbers seem to
be related to the developmental period when dissociative fragmentation first begins.
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out, interacting with the environment, information gets stored in its file.
The file must be brought up and displayed on the screen to retrieve the
information.'" Unlike most computers, this one lacks a file directory
listing the names of the fies or indicating in which file the particular
information is stored.
How does an attorney recover information under such conditions? This
will not be a problem for the plaintiffs attorney because she will have
already identified the states housing memories necessary to present the
plaintiffs side. Yet, these states may not hold the complete memory.
They may have missed crucial segments of the incident. This, in turn,
may cause them to misunderstand what happened during the part at
which they were present. The situation is somewhat like arriving late for
a movie. People who arrive late for a movie often misunderstand what is
happening. Identity states have an even greater chance of making mis-
takes because they frequently fail to appreciate that the movie has al-
ready started. For an identity who awakes to find a stranger in her bed
attempting intercourse and cannot remember inviting him, there is only
one explanation; she is the victim of a sexual assault."5
Cross-examining a state that has misconstrued its experience will be
useless if the missing piece of the memory is held by some other state.
What happened to the body when the testifying state was not out may be
crucial to evaluating the witness's testimony. This information will re-
main unreachable, however, unless a key can be found to unlock the
witness's memory.
The only person who holds a possible key is the witness's psychother-
apist."° If the witness has been in treatment for an extended period, the
Multiples who suffer their first split very early in life tend to have much larger and
more disorganized personality systems than those whose personality fragmentation
begins after the age of eight. Id. at 127; Kluft, supra note 7, at 369-70.
104. See supra notes 60-61, 97-102 and accompanying text.
105. Incidents like this are not far-fetched. See infra notes 134 and accompanying
text.
106. The defense will not be able to obtain the information needed to compensate
for the missing file directory through an independent psychological evaluation per-
formed by a defense expert. Modem courts are reluctant to invade the privacy of
prosecution witnesses by ordering them to submit to compulsory psychological evalu-
ations. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 393 N.E.2d 400, 405 (Mass. 1979) (plac-
ing limitations on judge's ability to order psychiatric examinations in order to "min-
imize the seriousness of the invasion of the witness's privacy"); People v. Davis, 283
N.W.2d 768, 771 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to compel victim to undergo a men-
tal examination); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 575 (Wyo. 1990) (stating that psycho-
therapist is likely to know the names, roles, functions, personality char-
acteristics, and standard behaviors of the witness's identities. This
knowledge enables the therapist to have a decent idea about which
states are most likely to have been out during a given incident.'7 More-
over, the therapist is also likely to know which states make the best
informants. Some states snoop around, eavesdrop, and make it their
business to know what is going on elsewhere in the system.' °
logical examination may not be required of victim who is a witness rather than a
party); see also State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 92-93, 94-95 (Mont. 1990) (noting that
child witness's right to privacy outweighs the defendant's right to review therapy
records where defendant was child's father and should have known the information
therein), overruled on other grounds by State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991).
Legislatures in some jurisdictions have even stripped courts of the power to do this.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West 1985) (denying courts discretion to require
witnesses to submit to a psychological examination to assess credibility); ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/115-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (barring courts from ordering mental
exam of sexual assault victim). Even if a court could be convinced to order the
witness to submit to an evaluation, this examination would not produce the informa-
tion the defense needs. It takes the patient's trust and years of psychotherapy to
acquire the in-depth knowledge needed to figure out which states are most likely to
participate in particular types of incidents.
107. Many dissociative disorders experts recommend using maps, diagrams, and
blueprints to assemble information about the patient's personality systems. See, e.g.,
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 210-11; Braun, supra note 49, at 14. In the following pas-
sage, Dr. Frank Putnam explains the advantages of careful, systematic data collection.
One of the mentioned advantages is the ability to predict, based on the patient's
behavior and type of incident, which states were probably out during a given inci-
dent.
If the list of alters is kept up to date, the therapist will acquire a great deal
of valuable information about the size, composition, and structure of the
overall personality system .... [T]he list will indicate something about the
perceived roles or functions of the alters .... The therapist will . . . have
some idea of which alters are likely to be responsible for specific pathologi-
cal or dangerous behaviors.
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 143 (emphasis added).
108. In MPD, there can be pockets of interpersonality awareness in some parts of
the system and rigid memory barriers in others. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 140-
41; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 114-15; PUTNAM, Recent Research, supra note 49, at 494-
95; Braun, supra note 49, at xiv; Kiuft, supra note 37, at 560-65. MPD amnesia has a
highly complex nature. "Individuals with this disorder experience frequent gaps in
memory for personal history, both remote and recent. The amnesia is frequently
asymmetrical. The more passive identities tend to have more constricted memories,
whereas the more hostile, controlling, or "protector" identities have more complete
memories." DSM-IV, supra note 9, at 484-85.
Many systems have "historians" who claim to maintain complete records of the
patient's life history and current events. In the NIMH survey, over 75% of the patients
had at least one alter who claimed this knowledge. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 114-15.
The therapist is also likely to know which states have the most inclusive powers of
memory. This information will be extremely helpful to the defense.
[Vol. 23: 387, 1996] Witnesses With Multiple Personality Disorder
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The witness's psychotherapist is the only person who has the informa-
tion the defense will need to figure out which states to cross-examine.
Yet, this will pose a problem. Most jurisdictions confer a testimonial priv-
ilege on communications made between a patient and psychothera-
pist.' O° While the information the defense will need is technically cov-
109. Some form of psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized by statute in more
than 40 states. See Jonathan Baumoel, Comment, The Beginning of the End for the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 797, 802 (1992). For a summary
of privilege laws, see Barbara W. Weiner, Provider-Patient Relations: Confidentiality
and Liability, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 559, 592-96 (Samuel Jan
Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985). See generally Samuel J. Knapp et al., Privileged
Communications for Psychotherapists in Pennsylvania: A Time for Statutory Re-
form, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 267 (1987) (outlining the applicable law for mental health profes-
sionals); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychia-
trists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980) (discussing the application of the attorney-client
privilege to psychiatrists and their patients); Steven R. Smith, Medical and Psycho-
therapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving with One Hand and Removing
with the Other, 75 KY. L.J. 473 (1986) (discussing the inconsistent protection afforded
to psychotherapy patients); Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1471-1500, 1530-63 (1985) (considering the theories and justifi-
cations for privileged communications in general and discussing medical and
counseling privileges) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; William Hague, Com-
ment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Washington: Extending the Privilege
to Community Mental Health Clinics, 58 WASH. L. REV. 565 (1983) (discussing the
current structure of psychotherapist-privilege laws in Washington); Kerry L. Morse,
Comment, A Uniform Testimonial Privilege for Mental Health Professionals, 51 OHIo
ST. L.J. 741 (1990) (discussing the current law on mental health privileges). Privilege
statutes operate to protect socially important relationships by allowing relevant and
probative evidence to be withheld from the jury. Privilege, consequently, is purchased
at the cost of reduced accuracy in fact-finding. See, e.g., United States v. Tsinrninne,
601 F.2d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Witness's privileges are inherent barriers to the
fact-finding mission of trial courts. They operate to exclude relevant, probative evi-
dence and run counter to the general proposition that each person must present all
of the relevant evidence within his or her grasp."), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980).
Two justifications are commonly given for recognizing a psychotherapist-patient
privilege: the utilitarian justification and the privacy rationale. The utilitarian justifi-
cation focuses on the damage that will be done to the effectiveness of treatment if
privilege is not recognized. It forecasts that, without protection of privilege, patients
will withhold information needed for their cures. See, e.g., Knapp et al., supra, at 8-
12; Smith, supra, at 477-78; Developments in the Law, supra, at 1471-80; Hague, su-
pra, at 568-72. The privacy rationale focuses on the damage done to the patient in
the courtroom from having her most intimate and private matters made public. See,
e.g., Steven R. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 48-50, 59-60 (1980); Developments in the Law, supra, at 1480-83.
The concerns behind the utilitarian justification for privilege are overstated. A
survey conducted by Professors Shuman and Weiner several years ago indicates that
ered by privilege,' courts would misapply the privilege doctrine by al-
most patients are unaware of the law of privilege; consequently, privilege has little
impact on patients' behavior. See Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privi-
lege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60
N.C. L. REV. 893, 920, 924-25 (1982); see also Paul S. Applebaum et al., Confidenti-
ality: An Empirical Test of the Utilitarian Perspective, 12 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 109 (1984); Ralph Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege:
A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 649, 650 (1974); 25 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5522 (1990).
Considering that millions of Americans attend support groups meetings where they
reveal their most intimate secrets to rooms full of strangers and that patients prosper
equally well in countries that do not recognize privilege, the claim that privilege is
essential to effective treatment is hard to believe.
Protection of' privacy, the second justification for recognizing a psychotherapy-
patient privilege, carries little force for patients who elect to air matters that were
the focus of therapy in a public courtroom. By making these matters public, the
patients show, by their conduct, that privacy is not the most important consideration
for them.
110. Psychotherapy-patient privilege statutes are riddled with exceptions. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 109, at 502. None of the exceptions give criminal defendants the
right to obtain clinical information about prosecution witnesses. For a summary of
existing exceptions, see, e.g., Smith, supra note 109, at 508-22 and Weiner, supra
note 109, at 560-70, 592-96.
Blocked by privilege statutes, criminal defense attorneys sometimes offer con-
stitutional arguments to support their discovery requests. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
the Supreme Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
confers a constitutional right to discover information covered by a testimonial privi-
lege. 480 U.S. 39, 45 (1987) (plurality decision). The defendant contended that he had
a Sixth Amendment right to discover a confidential child abuse investigative report
on the grounds that the information was necessary for effective cross-examination. Id.
at 51. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, rejected this argument, stating that
the Sixth Amendment is purely a trial right. Id. at 52. It guarantees the right to
cross-examine in court, but not the right to engage in pretrial discovery to make
cross-examination more effective. Id. at 52-53. While rejecting the Sixth Amendment
claim, the Ritchie Court did recognize a limited Fourteenth Amendment claim. Id. at
58. The Fourteenth Amendment places a duty on the government to disclose infor-
mation in its possession to the accused if the information is "material to guilt or
punishment." Id. at 57.
The requirement that the information be in the government's possession limits
the Fourteenth Amendment's usefulness in forcing production of a prosecution
witness's therapy records. See, e.g., People v. Overton, 759 P.2d 772, 774 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988); People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ill. App. Ct), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1047 (1988); State v. Reynolds, 792 P.2d 1111, 1115 (Mont. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Kyle, 533 A.2d 120, 125-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 541 A.2d 744 (Pa
1988); cf. People v. Caplan, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478, 487 (Ct App. 1987) (holding the de-
fendant is entitled to discovery that aids his defense and reversing and remanding the
case). Courts have, nevertheless, occasionally stretched Ritchie, particularly when
faced with strong showings of need. See, e.g., Kirby v. State, 581 So. 2d 1136, 1141
(Ala. Crim. App. 1990); State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 445, 453-54
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Boyette, 247 Cal. Rptr. 795, 801 (Ct. App. 1988); State
v. D'Ambrosia, 561 A.2d 422, 428 (Conn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990);
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lowing a witness who has already testified on direct examination to de-
cide how much of her memory and powers of recall will be open to
cross-examination."' The judge should balance the witness's treatment
Bobo v. State, 349 S.E.2d 690, 694 (Ga. 1986); State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719, 724-25
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993). Interestingly, in two of the cases where the defense succeeded
in gaining access to the witness's therapy records, the witness had MPD. See Romley,
836 P.2d at 450; Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d at 723 (describing MPD as "post-traumatic stress
disorder" caused by childhood incest). But see State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 92-95
(Mont. 1990) (noting that child witness's right to privacy outweighs the defendant's
right to review therapy records where defendant was child's father and should have
known the information therein), overruled on other grounds by State v. Imlay, 813
P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991).
111. One way the legal system deals with witnesses who refuse to be cross-exam-
ined is by striking their testimony on direct examination. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Kirouac, 542 N.E.2d 270, 273 (Mass. 1989); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 567. N.E.2d
943, 952 (Mass. Ct App.), review denied, 571 N.E.2d 28 (1991); see also Bagby v.
Kuhlman, 932 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir.) (dicta), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 926 (1991). Even
though a multiple's refusal to release clinical records is slightly different, the legal
system would scarcely tolerate a deaf witness thwarting cross-examination by refusing
to wear a hearing-aid. If a witness has control over whether she can be cross-exam-
ined and refuses to cooperate, her testimony should be stricken, at least in cases
where cross-examination might change the outcome.
A Georgia court considered a related issue in Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224
(Ga. Ct App. 1992). After an alternate identity-state called "Little Wendy" testified on
direct examination, this state disappeared and the witness could no longer remember
her former testimony. Id. at 228. The defense asked for a mistrial. Id. The prosecu-
tor, nevertheless, succeeded in persuading "Little Wendy" to come out again. The de-
fense refused to cross-examine the witness, maintaining that a witness who needs to
enter a dissociative state to remember her former testimony is incompetent. Id. at
226-28. The Georgia Court rejected this argument, but, nevertheless, observed:
At Mr. Dorsey's trial, each of the three personalities that appeared and testi-
fied-Big Wendy, Little Wendy and Trouble-was made available for cross-
examination, but Mr. Dorsey's counsel chose not to ask any questions based
on his position that testimony from a witness in a dissociative state was not
admissible and that the victim was not competent to testify. From these facts
in the record, we conclude appellants had ample opportunity to cross-exam-
ine the witness in each dissociative state in which she testified and empha-
size that we probably would have been compelled to reach a different conclu-
sion had appellants not been given this opportunity.
Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
In the quoted passage, the Georgia court was concerned with protecting the
defense's right to cross-examine a state that had testified on direct The defendant's
interest in cross-examination, however, should not be limited to states testifying on
direct because these states may not possess the information the defense needs. While
the Georgia court was correct in assuming that the inability to cross-examine a multi-
ple might, in an appropriate case, afford grounds for excluding testimony, the court's
interests against the defendant's need for cross-examination. Because of
the danger of distorted recall,"' the need for cross-examination will be
greatest when the court lacks independent corroboration. Without cor-
roboration, determining the reliability of a multiple's testimony will be
difficult."' No one's fate should be decided based on testimony of un-
known reliability that cannot be cross-examined."4
Multiples suffer from another problem that can complicate cross-exam-
ination. They dissociate (i.e., switch identities) when they are exposed to
stress beyond their ability to cope."5 Since the courtroom atmosphere
is likely to be stressful, the defense may have difficulty hanging on to the
desired state."6 Transitions from one state to another can be rapid, so
rapid that one state can disappear in the middle of a sentence, and an-
other take over to complete it."7
concerns were stated too narrowly. In any case where cross-examination might change
the outcome, the court should give the witness a choice to release clinical information
or suffer exclusion of testimony.
112. See infra parts V-VII.
113. Four years ago, James Dorsey, a scholar, historian, Sunday school teacher, and
one of the most respected members of a small Georgia community, and his wife, a
high school guidance counselor, were convicted of rape and aggravated sodomy based
on the testimony of a young multiple who moved into their home after graduating
high school and lived with them for five years as their babysitter. Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d
at 225-26. During this period, "[sihe worked, dated and had many aspect of an appar-
ently normal life." Id. at 226. While the Dorseys admitted being sexually involved
with the young lady, they claimed that the involvement was consensual. Id. As with
most sexual victimization charges, no one but the immediate parties will ever know
what really happened. Yet, several explanations other than historic truth could ac-
count for the young woman's belief that she had been raped. Her belief could repre-
sent the mistaken impression of an identity who failed to appreciate that some other
state had consented, hypnotic hallucinations, flashbacks to scenes from the witness's
childhood, memories borrowed from the themes of books, movies or television pro-
grams, or memories unwittingly implanted during therapy. See infra notes 125-35
(mistaken impressions about what happened), 139-50 (hypnotic hallucinations), 151-53
(flashbacks), 155 (borrowed memories) and accompanying text; parts VI and VII
(memories unwittingly implanted during therapy). It is impossible to say whether
justice was served at the Dorsey trial. The chances of justice being served are in-
creased if judges are aware of risks inherent in a multiple's testimony when they rule
on defense requests for clinical information.
114. Nonetheless, discovery requests should be carefully screened to make sure the
defense genuinely desires the information and is not using the request to intimidate
an emotionally fragile witness into dropping the suit.
115. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 83.
116. For a description of the frustrations in trying to take a multiple's deposition,
see Hamilton & Ondrovik, supra note 95. In Dorsey, the witness switched after tes-
tifying on direct examination and was unable to remember her former testimony.
Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d at 226-28. The court denied the defense's motion for a mistrial
because the prosecutor was successful in persuading the desired state to come back
out again. Id. at 228.
117. While a switch can consume up to five minutes, most occur in a few seconds
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There are three signals that indicate a possible switch: physical man-
ifestations, changes in demeanor and carriage, and amnesia- Common
physical manifestations include eyelid flutters, eyeball rolls, rapid blink-
ing, twitching, startle responses, shudders, and facial grimaces."' In ad-
dition, switches are often accompanied by subtle changes in carriage and
demeanor, such as a transition from responsive to guarded or from age-
appropriate to infantile. Amnesia, the last indicator, will be the easiest to
recognize."' An identity often has little awareness of events before it
assumes executive control. Consequently, amnesia can be used as a test
for a covert change in state. When a switch is suspected, counsel should
ask the witness to summarize the testimony just given, repeat the last
question, or provide some other information that will indicate whether
the witness is maintaining a continuous, uninterrupted psychological
presence.
V. HALLUCINATIONS, FLASHBACKS, AND OTHER CAUSES
OF MEMORY DISTORTION
No witness has a perfect memory.'2° The memories of most witnesses
probably seem better than they really are because there are no photo-
graphs of the event against which to compare their testimony. When
examined closely, multiples' memories may seem flawed. Yet, the prob-
lem is not that multiples have poor memories; on the contrary, multiples
have extraordinary powers of concentration and absorb and store infor-
mation "in the manner that a sponge absorbs water."'2 ' They can often
or less. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 120-21; Richard J. Lowenstein, An Office Mental
Status Examination for Complex Chronic Dissociative Symptoms and Multiple Per-
sonality Disorder, 14 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. Am. 567, 598-600 (1991).
118. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 125-26; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 120-21.
119. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 83-84; Lowenstein, supra note 117, at 599-600.
120. The fallibility of eyewitness memory has been documented in numerous re-
search experiments. See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979);
ELzABETH LoFrus & JAMES F. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
(1987); GARY L WELLS & ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES (1984); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Re-
search and Legal Thought, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REV. OF RES. (M. Tonry
& N. Morris eds., 1981); see also Michael W. Mullane, The Truthsayer and the Court:
Expert Testimony on Credibility, 43 ME. L. REv. 53 (1991); Christopher M. Walters,
Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1402 (1985); Fredrich D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN.
L REV. 969 (1977).
121. George K Ganaway, Historical Versus Narrative Truth: Clarifying the Role of
remember events that took place years before with uncanny detail and
accuracy. Nonetheless, their memory performance is erratic. Dr. Richard
Kiuft warns that the memories multiples report may contain a mixture of
everything from "photographic recall" to "confabulation, screen phenome-
na, confusion between dreams or fantasies and reality, irregular recollec-
tions, and willful misrepresentations."'22
MPD can impair recall in various ways. Dissociation can fragment
experience and parcel segments of memory out among several states.
Fragmentation of experience can produce cognitive and perceptual er-
rors. Thus, a state present during only a part of the experience can mis-
construe what happened.'23 Therapy can aggravate this problem. Mis-
takes can be made in the process of matching memory parts up and
putting them together again.'24 To determine the accuracy of a witness's
testimony, it is helpful to examine mechanisms that can falsify a
multiple's recall.
A. Internal Foul Play
Many multiples are unaware of having other identities.'25 When things
go wrong in their lives, they naturally look beyond themselves for an
explanation. Nevertheless, this disorder lends itself to self-harassment.
Consequently, a multiple's misfortunes may sometimes be due to internal
foul play.
Multiples re-enact childhood abuses through internal self-persecu-
tion. "' Many personal systems have identities whose sole function is to
Exogenous Trauma in the Etiology of MPD and Its Variants, 2 DISSOCIATiON: PROG-
RESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 205, 208 (1989).
122. Richard P. Kluft, Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder: A Study of 33
Cases, 7 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 9, 14 (1984). In the passage below, Dr. Kluft
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of a multiple's memory:
The experiential world of highly dissociation-prone or hypnotizable individuals
reflects the positive and negative potentials of this trait. They may excel in
concentrating, have excellent memories, and experience emotions with great
intensity. Their capacity to use fantasy in the service of creativity may be
noteworthy. However, they are prone to bypass inconsistencies and incongrui-
ties .... [T]hey will endorse experiences that bear resemblance to items on
standard measures of hypnotizability but are usually considered signs of psy-
chosis, that is, hallucinations and passive influence experiences.
Kluft, supra note 37, at 559-60.
123. See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
124. See infra parts VI and VII.
125. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 107, 114, 151. "Multiple" is used here in the sense of
"host." The host is the state in control most of the time and is normally the state
that seeks treatment. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 108, 178-80, 206-07.
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torment the host.17 Internal persecutors do terrible things; they run up
bills, get multiples into legal scrapes, humiliate them socially, and even
mutilate their bodies. 2 ' When unexplainable mishaps occur, the host
becomes confused and assumes that outsiders are responsible. Several
years ago, an assistant United States Attorney fell victim to internal foul
play.' 29 While representing the government, she received threatening let-
ters3' and assumed that the letters had been sent by a terrorist whom
she was trying to extradite. 3 ' When an investigation revealed that she
had sent these letters to herself, her self-persecutors triumphed. The
young woman's career was destroyed.
3 2
Ambushes set up for the host sometimes catch the wrong quarry."
In the following passage, Dr. Frank Putnam explains how unsuspecting
strangers can get entangled in internal intrigues:
A common scenario reported by female MPD patients is for a promiscuous alter
to pick up a strange man, set up an intimate and often masochistic situation, and
then vanish, leaving the frightened and usually sexually frigid host personality to
contend with the stranger's advances. Not unexpectedly, the host interprets the
outcome of this internal setup as rape.'"
When asked why it had set up a masochistic situation and then van-
ished, one promiscuous identity told Dr. Putnam: "'I had to take it for
her [the host] when she was little-now I want her to feel what it was
like.'""
127. See, e.g., id. at 108.
128. Suicide attempts and self-lacerations often represent plots by self-persecutors to
harm the host. Id. at 108. Delusions of separateness can be so complete that one
state may try to murder another, oblivious to the personal consequences. Id.
129. See Insanity Ruling for Fake Death Threat, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 11, 1989, at A6.
130. Threats like this are reasonably common. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at
206 (reviewing common manifestations of internal persecution). One of the authors
had a patient who began receiving threatening messages on her telephone answering
system from a strange caller who seemed to know everything about her and her
children. She became terrified that someone was following her. The strange caller
turned out to be a self-persecutory identity.
131. See Insanity Ruling for Fake Death Threat, supra note 129, at A6.
132. Id. Criminal charges were also brought against her. They were dropped when
the government consented to accept her insanity plea. Id.
133. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 111, 179.
134. Id. at 111.
135. Id. at 179.
B. Confabulation
Confabulation is an unconscious process in which gaps in memory are
filled through the insertion of imagined experiences that the subject
believes are real."' The human mind naturally tends to insert missing
details needed to round out actual memories. The minds of multiples,
however, are capable of confabulating on a different plane. Their minds
can create memories of experiences believed to have gone on for long
periods, perhaps weeks or months. Confabulation serves to smooth out
time discontinuities and to eliminate the terror of, for example, going to
sleep in December and waking up in July, with no recollection of what
happened in between.'37 Waking up after several months of being dor-
mant, the host may believe that it has been away on a vacation, in the
hospital, or engaged in some internally manufactured experience for
which it will have a full set of sham memories. One of our colleagues
tells of a patient who entered treatment with richly detailed memories of
normal childhood interactions with his mother. As the therapy pro-
gressed, these memories disintegrated and the patient discovered that his
mother had in fact been distant and cold, and that he had almost no
interactions with her. The experiences the patient remembered turned
out to be sham memories confabulated to disguise lost periods of child-
hood when other states were in control.'"
C. Hallucinations and Flashbacks
Multiples are highly hypnotizable. 30 High hypnotic capacity is accom-
panied by several traits that can cause internal self-contamination of
memory.' People who are highly hypnotizable tend to fantasize a great
136. See, e.g., Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock, Typical Signs and Symptoms
of Psychiatric Illness, in 1 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 499, 501 (Kaplan
& Sadock eds., 4th ed. 1985).
137. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 73-74.
138. Interview with Dr. Elizabeth Bowman, Assistant Professor, Indiana University
School of Medicine, in Louisville, Ky. (July 3, 1993).
139. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
140. Several cognitive changes are associated with hypnotic states. These changes
include an increase in imaginative capacity and willingness to accept suggestion, as
well as a reduction in critical judgment. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 98-99;
HILWARD, supra note 38, at 163-65; Ganaway, supra note 121, at 208-09. These chang-
es do not occur to the same extent in all subjects. The amount of change varies
with the subject's hypnotic capacity. See, e.g., HILGARD, supra note 38, at 156-84;
HELoMUD, supra note 49, at 88, 219-24, 270-74, 285-87. Gross distortions of reality are
likely to occur only in subjects who are highly hypnotizable. See HILGARD, supra note
38, at 91-100, 156-184; Ganaway, supra note 121, at 208-14. The traits that prompt
distortions during hypnosis are part of a subject's own personality. See, e.g., BuSs,
supra note 4, at 70, 77-81, 94-95; Susan M. Powers, Fantasy Proneness and the UFO
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deal of the time.'41 Yet, their fantasies are not like the daydreams of or-
dinary people. Their mental imagery is intensely vivid, detailed, and life-
like. '42 A multiple can hallucinate the sound of a gun, smell its smoke,
feel the pain of the bullet entering his body, and watch his blood gush
from his chest.'43 His mental imagery can be so frighteningly real that
he may call his therapist in a panic to report nonexistent injuries."
On reason why multiples mistake their fantasies for reality is that they
are unaware of slipping into a trance.4 Trances differ from dreams.
Fantasies experienced in dreams seem intensely real at the time; how-
ever, dreams are not mistaken for reality because normally reality-testing
Abduction Phenomenon, 4 DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DIssocIATvE DISORDERS 46,
46-48 (1991).
141. Dr. Josephine Hilgard, who has spent years studying the childhood backgrounds
and personality characteristics of people who are highly hypnotizable, asserts: "As we
look at the various kinds of involvements found among the hypnotically susceptible,
we cannot but be impressed by the capacity of the hypnotizable person to set aside
reality and to live in a world of vivid fantasy." HILGARD, supra note 49, at 88. This
capacity is exhibited across many aspects of a multiple's life, including the creation
of alter personality systems. Dr. Richard Kluft reports treating a patient with a per-
sonality system configured on J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings, complete with
hobbits, orcs, and wizards. See Kluft, supra note 12, at 51. Dr. George Ganaway men-
tions finding identities that included everything from demons and angels to tigers,
gorillas, chickens, lobsters, and a unicorn. See Ganaway, supra note 121, at 209.
142. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 73-74. In the following passage, Dr. Eugene
Bliss describes the fantasies of the highly hypnotizable.
Many have vivid sexual fantasies, so realistic that three-quarters achieve or-
gasms in this way. When they are asked to imagine a dog, they will see it
run into the room and feel it lick their faces. Furthermore, "they will tend to
confuse memories of their fantasies with real world events." Many will be-
come ill when they see violence on television or the movies because the
experience can become so personal and real. Most have had illness or physi-
cal symptoms directly related to their thoughts, fantasies, and memories.
Practically all have had "extra-sensory" occurrences, precognitive dreams, and
out-of-body experiences.
Id. at 77.
143. See, e.g., Biuss, supra note 4, at 74, 79.
144. Dr. George Ganaway mentions an incident in which a multiple telephoned her
psychiatrist to report that a self-persecutory identity had just slashed her vagina with
a razor and that she was bleeding profusely. An emergency gynecological exam re-
vealed that the whole incident was imagined. See Ganaway, supra note 121, at 210.
145. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 79-80. People who are highly hypnotizable do
not need formal induction to experience hypnosis. They slip into trance whenever
their attention becomes overly concentrated and focused. This can happen from read-
ing a book, watching a television program, or even staring too long into a pond. Id.
at 67-78.
is restored when the dreamer awakes and realizes that the experience
was just a dream. The existence of clear boundaries between sleep and
waking states thus preserves reality-testing. On the other hand, there are
no clear boundaries between waking states and trance states. Unaware
that they are slipping into the hypnotic realm, multiples have nothing to
help them preserve reality-testing. "6
Once inside a trance, the line between internal and external reality
vanishes and fantasies come alive. "7 Multiples experience their past
memories with realistic intensity; they can also experience their hypnotic
fantasies with the same realistic intensity. "8 Their real memories and
hypnotic fantasies often seem equally real to them. "9 The power of hyp-
146. A high percentage of patients with this disorder, perhaps as many as one-third,
believe that they were childhood victims of satanic ritual abuse (SRA). See, e.g.,
Kluft, supra note 12, at 50; see also Philip M. Coons & Finlay Grier, Factitious Dis-
order (Munchausen Type) Involving Allegations of Ritual Satanic Abuse: A Case
Report, 3 DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 177, 177-78 (1990)
(discussing specific case of woman diagnosed with MPD claiming to have been in-
volved in a satanic cult); supra notes 12, 31. Patients recall being tortured in caves
by people wearing black robes, watching the ceremonial murder of their incestuously
conceived babies, participating in acts of cannibalism, and taking part in other har-
rowing atrocities. Controversy over the historic accuracy of these memories has po-
larized the MPD treatment community. See Coons & Grier, supra, at 177-78; Ganaway,
supra note 121, at 211-17; Lanning, supra note 31, at 172; Powers, supra note 140;
John Johnson, County Panel Scrutinized for Satanic Claims Cults: Some Members of
Ritual Abuse Task Force Contend That Devil Worshipers Are Poisoning Them, LA.
TIMES, Dec: 13, 1993, at B1 (listing examples of ritual abuse found in task force
handbook); Alfred Lubrano, Ritual Abuse: Deadly Memories, Are Macabre Tales Fic-
tions or Felonies?, NEWSDAY, May 10, 1993, at 15 (discussing memories of ritual
abuse discovered during therapy); Perry, supra note 31. A growing number of dissoci-
ative disorders specialists have begun urging restraint in validating unsubstantiated
reports of abuse by patients with this disorder. See, e.g., Ganaway, supra note 121,
at 207; Michael J. Grinfeld & Jesse Reisman, Childhood Sex Abuse Memories Haunt
Victims, Divide Experts: Task Forces to Seek Elusive Truth As Debate Flares, PSY-
CHIATRIC TIMES, Aug. 1993, at 2 (quoting Dr. David Spiegel); see also irfra notes 149,
164, 169.
147. Highly hypnotizable subjects have difficulty maintaining reality-testing when they
undergo hypnosis because of the intensity of their inward focus. They become so
absorbed in affairs of the mind that they lose track of themselves and external reali-
ty; their mental experience is all that exists. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 105-08.
This gives mental experiences a realism that they would not have if the subject's
attention were divided between her thought processes and the physical world. Id. at
105-06.
148. See, e.g., BLISS, supra note 4, at 78-81, 98.
149. A growing number of dissociative disorders experts have begun urging caution
in authenticating unsubstantiated MPD abuse reports. See, e.g., Ganaway, supra note
121, at 210; Kluft, supra note 122, at 13-14; see also supra note 146, infra note 164.
Dr. Frank Putnam warns:
In some cases, specific events or specific versions of an event will have
clear fantasy components; in many other cases, the therapist and patient will
[Vol. 23: 387, 1996] Witnesses With Multiple Personality Disorder
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
notic fantasy is exhibited across numerous aspects of a multiple's life,
but nowhere is this power more clearly revealed than in the ability of
multiples to assume other identities. Alter personality constellations may
include nonhuman creatures, as well as the purely grotesque. In the mys-
terious realm of the identity, demons, lobsters, and chickens take them-
selves seriously and five year-old boys are not distressed to inhabit the
bodies of middle-aged women."
Multiples are vulnerable to another kind of hypnotic experi-
ence-flashbacks.' A fleeting observation or environmental cue can
precipitate a flashback.'52 Without warning, the multiple is hurled back
in time to relive a past ordeal with all of its original sounds, smells, an-
guishes, and terrors; even the physical pain of the traumatic event is ex-
perienced. In the following passage, Dr. Frank Putnam describes the
agony of relentless flashbacks:
The past and the present intermingle and follow each other in chronological con-
fusion. Flashbacks, with their accompanying distortions of age and body image,
send a patient hurtling backwards to relive trauma that seems more vivid now
than when it actually occurred .... Time is discontinuous for multiples. The
breaks are more than the simple lapses in continuity produced by the personality
switches; inversions and reversals in a patient's sense of time are produced by
flashbacks to past events. Reality testing is impaired by the lack of a firm "now"
against which to measure what is past and what is present.'"
"Memory borrowing" is another trait connected with high hypnotic
capacity. The highly hypnotizable have such intense powers of absorp-
tion that when they read a book, watch a television program, or see a
never be sure what actually occurred and what was fantasy. I do not know
of any way to sort out truth from fantasy in these cases. One may argue
that "it is all real to the patient" and therefore the actual veracity does not
matter, but . . . "there are times when it seens to be of prime importance
to ascertain the truth."
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 245.
150. See supra note 141.
151. Flashbacks are associated with posttraumatic stress disorders. PUTNAM, supra
note 1, at 236. They can be cued by sights, sounds, smells, behaviors, and other
normal everyday objects or experiences. Id. at 237-38. During flashbacks, dissociative
memory barriers break down and traumatic memories flood back into consciousness.
Past events are experienced as if they are happening in the present Hypnotic flash-
backs have all the sensory vividness and intensity of a present experience. See, e.g.,
Buss, supra note 4, at. 78-79.
152. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 237-38.
153. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 79, 107-08.
154. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 177.
movie, they lose track of themselves and their surroundings, identify
with the characters, and undergo vicarious experiences."u Their vicari-
ous experiences are so intensely real that they may later forget the
source of their memory and recall the experience as something that actu-
ally happened to them.
VI. TESTIMONY BASED ON "RESTORED MEMORY"
A multiple's testimony will often be based on "restored memories,"
memories that have been recovered and pieced together in therapy rather
than the multiple's original unspoiled memory impressions. This Part de-
scribes how dissociated memories are restored.
When eight-year-old Sue "blacked out" while being sexually abused by
her father, "Ann" (an alternate identity-state) rushed to the scene where
she saw a man she had never seen before molesting Sue. "Ann" struggled
with the stranger and tried to push him away. When the stranger over-
powered "Ann," she became terrified and fled via dissociation. "Barbara,"
another alter, was watching in the background.' 6 "Barbara" recognized
Sue's father as the molester, but decided against getting involved because
she felt Sue had brought this misfortune upon herself. A few minutes
later "Carol" arrived. By this time Sue was asleep, cradled in her father's
arms, and "Carol" thought to herself, "What a lucky girl Sue is to have
such a warm and loving father.""7 Now imagine that Sue was constantly
155. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 77; HmGARD, supra note 38, at 104-06, 160-61;
HILGARD, supra note 49, at 270-74; Ganaway, supra note 121, at 208-09.
156. Several states can share consciousness at the same time. PUTNAM, supra note
1, at 114-15.
157. Overwhelming events may be too much for any one state to endure. The ex-
perience may be divided up and parceled out among several states, each of which is
aware of only part of what happened. Dissociative fragmentation of experience can
occur along several lines. Sequential fragmentation is one pattern. As each successive
state becomes overwhelmed, reinforcements are sent in to take over. Thus, Identity A
may be aware of events leading up to a rape, Identity B of events happening after-
wards, and a whole cadre of identities may be aware of bits and pieces of what
happened in between. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 125. Aspects of the experience, such
as knowledge, emotions, sensations, and behavior, can also be divided up and rear-
ranged. Thus, Identity A may have intellectual knowledge of an event, but be uncer-
tain whether this knowledge amounts to a memory because the usual feelings accom-
panying such events are lacking. Identity B may feel an overpowering sense of rage,
terror, or grief, but lack insight into the origin of these feelings. Identity C may be
compulsively driven to engage in behaviors constituting a symbolic re-enactment of
the event, but have no idea why. Id. at 198-200. Dr. Putnam refers to the dissociative
parceling out of memories of a single unbearable event among several states as "lay-
ering" because information about the event tends to reach the therapist in layers. Id.
at 124-25. Identities with memories of less terrifying aspects of the experience tend
to arrive first, while the others hold back until the therapist has been tested and
found trustworthy. Id. at 124. "Layering" serves an important defensive purpose-it
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abused, physically, sexually, and emotionally, throughout her childhood,
and that each time she dissociated, different states were present. Years
later, when Sue entered psychotherapy, she remembered none of this.
This describes the kind of dissociative memory problems multiples bring
into treatment.'8
During the therapy, numerous memory fragments will be collected
from the patient's identities." These fragments will be matched up,
pieced together, and reassembled into whole memories. The whole mem-
ories will then be shared with other parts of the personality system. The
MPD treatment model concentrates heavily on memory work.'" The
theory behind this model is, in part, that once the secrets are out and
traumatic memories have been shared, memory barriers will no longer be
needed. Consequently, they will gradually disappear and personality inte-
gration will gradually follow.'6
Some memories are recovered relatively intact, but stronger defenses
are needed for unbearable memories. It may be necessary to call up
fortifies dissociative defenses by scrambling up memories in ways that make it dif-
ficult for the parts to be reassembled and the event later remembered. Id. at 125.
158. Most contemporary learning about MPD comes from clinical studies; however,
memory research scientists have recently acquired an interest in this area and have
begun studying MPD in memory research laboratories. See, e.g., Daniel L. Schacter et
al., Autobiographical Memory in a Case of Multiple Personality, 98 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 508 (1989). While this development is exciting, research scientists have
not yet advanced learning beyond what is already known about this disorder from
clinical studies.
159. Identities do not gauge their comings and goings by the therapist's need for in-
formation. They have their own agendas. Their arrival is normally triggered by events
taking place in the patient's life outside of therapy. See supra notes 67-72 and ac-
companying text. This causes the patient's past to unfold in chronological disarray.
See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 72-74, 198-200 (noting the difficulty in assembling
patients' histories). The task of memory gathering is further complicated by different
states giving contradictory accounts of what happened. Id. at 72, 245, 248. Inconsis-
tencies are often attributable to different states, present at the event, placing different
interpretations on what happened. Dr. Putnam relates a case in which one alter de-
scribed an episode of incest as a violent rape. Id. at 248. Another perceived the in-
cident as an expression of paternal love. Id. A third confirmed that the incident in-
volved rape, but described the victim as a total stranger. Id. Contradictory reports
are not as peculiar as they may seem at first. Events such as incest stir up a mix-
ture of feelings. For victims with integrated psyches, inconsistent attitudes are viewed
as a manifestation of ambivalence. With multiples, ambivalence may take another
form; different states may have contradictory impressions about what happened. Id.
160. For a description of the methods, techniques, and goals of MPD memory work,
see PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 72-82, 173-74, 197-252.
161. See id. at 115.
whole cadres of identities to share the terror and pain by taking up a
small piece of the memory. How do MPD therapists help a patient reas-
semble a childhood that has been dissociatively shattered and ground
into bits and pieces? Therapy must proceed very slowly, with great pa-
tience, but perhaps not always with 100% accuracy. Dr. Frank Putnam,
who heads the National Institute of Mental Health Dissociative Disorders
Unit, warns:
This is slow, methodical work. In the beginning, little is going to make sense. The
therapist will meet some alters who exhibit powerful affects for which there is
little content; other alters have bits and pieces of vivid memory detail, but are un-
able to place this content into a larger context. This is a large, multidimensional
puzzle that the therapist and patient have to assemble one piece at a time. The
patient will continually provide clues, but he or she does not know the answer
either, and powerful psychic processes are at work that attempt to suppress, dis-
tort, or otherwise impair recall of traumas. Time, patience, trust, and working
through alter by alter, level by level, will slowly assemble a coherent and
chronological picture of the trauma that precipitated and perpetuated the patient's
fragmentation into a multiple personality.'"
In the following passage, Dr. Putnam describes how he helped a pa-
tient reassemble a memory of watching her father kill her dog and
threaten her with the same fate if she ever disclosed his incestuous activ-
ities:
Often one traces memory and affect in a parallel fashion, slowly assembling a
coherent whole from the bits and pieces of abreactive fragments. In one patient,
for example, the work began with a feeling of overwhelming sick dread that was
evoked by the sound of a train. The patient was unable to associate any memories
to this stimulus, but the sounds of a passing locomotive or train whistle would
result in rapid switching of alters who exhibited affects of fear, horror, grief, and
anger, respectively. The angry alter threatened to kill the patient's father because
he was a bastard, but provided no other details. The grief-stricken alter mourned
the death of a dog who was her only companion on an isolated Midwestern farm.
The horrified alter reported watching her father tie her dog to the railroad tracks
that passed behind the family farm, and the fearful alter was still bound by the
threat that this would happen to her someday. The memory that [ultimately]
emerged was of her father taldng her pet, tying it to the railroad tracks, and mak-
ing her watch the yelping dog ground to pieces by a freight train. He threatened
that the same would happen to her if she ever revealed his incestuous activities to
anyone. '
Undertaking a multiple's treatment requires extraordinary patience and
skill. For therapists who lack these traits, formulations designed to clari-
fy the past can become acts of creation, rather than acts of discovery.'"
162. Id. at 199.
163. Id. at 199-200.
164. The possibility of planting false memories during therapy has recently become
the center of a storm of controversy. See supra note 10; infra note 169. The contro-
versy centers on the extent to which the recent sharp rise in childhood sexual abuse
allegations is being fueled by therapists who are looking too hard for childhood sexu-
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al abuse memories where none exist. See, e.g., Boodman, The Professional Debate
supra note 10, at Z13; Bonnie Gangelhoff, A Mental Health Dilemma: Searching for
Truths in "Memories," HOUSTON POST, June 12, 1994, at El; Gentry, supra note 10, at
IA; Daniel Goleman, How Reliable Is Your Memory? Coding Process May Hold An-
swer, MIAMI HERALD, June 2, 1994, at IG; Jean L. Griffin, Specter of False Memories
Can Taint Sex Cases, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 1993, at 1; Gloria Hochman, Prisoners of
Memory: Nothing Rips Families Apart Like Recollections of a Parent's Sexual Abuse,
Especially If They're Untrue, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 6, 1993, at 12 (Magazine); Jacobs,
supra note 10, at 1; Richard J. Metzner, A Legitimate Therapy Suffers Rip-Offs; Sex-
ual Abuse: Pressures for Faster, Cost-Effective Therapy Have Contributed to a New
Syndrome of False "Recovered Memories," L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at B7; Tom Philp,
Recovered-Memory Debate: Quackery or Crime Solver?, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 24,
1994, at Al; Betsy Rubiner, Memories Serve, in Court--Repression, Trauma Cases
Under Debate, USA TODAY, Nov. 29, 1993, at 2A; Scanlon, supra note 10, at 1D;
Thrity Umrigar, False Memories: Some Call It Suggestion. Others Say It's Backlash.
No One Is Really Sure, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Oct. 23, 1994, at El. This issue is
now being discussed at professional conferences, in scientific literature, on talk
shows, and in the popular media. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text; in-
fra note 169 and accompanying text. More than 200 books have already been written
on this subject. See Elizabeth Brixey, Conference on Sexual Abuse to Explore False
Memory, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 15, 1994, at Cl. Psychologist Michael Yapko wrote a book
based on a survey he made of 860 mental health professionals. See MICHAEL D.
YAPKO, SUGGESTIONS OF ABUSE: TRUE AND FALSE MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD SExUAL TRAU-
MA (1994). His survey was designed to test levels of awareness of how memory oper-
ates and the dangers of suggestion in psychotherapy relationships. Id. at 20. Based on
the results of his survey, Dr. Yapko concluded that many therapists hold erroneous
views on the workings of memory, repression, and hypnosis. Id. at 61. Further, he
found that therapists often practice their profession based on sexual abuse symptom
checklists that have no validity and are "sheer myth." Id. at 20. Dr. Yapko believes
that suggestive techniques and interventions are responsible, in large part, for the
present epidemic of remembering incest. Id. at 27-29, 31, 89-91.
Dr. Leonore Terr, who served as an expert witness in the highly publicized
Franklin-Lipsker recovered-memory murder trial and who is one of the leading
spokespersons for the other side, has also written a book. See LEONORE TERR, UN-
CHAINED MEMORIES: TRUE STORIES OF TRAUMATIC MEMORIES LOST AND FOUND (1994).
Dr. Terr's research is based on clinical experience with traumatized children and
adults. In her book, she attempts to explain how memories of childhood horrors like
incest or murder can be repressed and then surface years later, relatively intact and
unchanged. She believes that traumatic memories, once buried and repressed, deterio-
rate very little and when they return are relatively unchanged. Id. at 40-41.
The false-memory controversy has spilled over into the courts. Hoards of pa-
tients are now filing suits against parents, siblings, teachers, clergy, and others, claim-
ing that they have recently recovered repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse.
See supra note 12. Parents have begun countersuing therapists for implanting false
memories in their children. See generally supra note 10-11 (providing authorities that
deal with this topic). Children sometimes recant and join with their parents in suing
the therapist for malpractice. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 10, at 1; Knight, supra
Multiples are easily influenced by what authority figures tell them. This
tendency is related to their high hypnotic capacities." People who are
highly hypnotizable have cognitive traits that create abnormal suggestibil-
ity." The highly hypnotizable are gifted with spirited imaginations and
note 10, at A6; Salter, supra note 10, at Al.
In 1993, the American Psychological Association set up a task force to study the
scientific status of repressed and dissociated memories. See Grinfeld & Reisman, su-
pra note 146, at 1. After months of study, the team of experts on the task force
came to the conclusion that "'while it is possible for memories of abuse that have
been forgotten for a long time to be remembered . . . [iut is also possible to con-
struct convincing pseudo-memories for events that never happened.'" See Carolyn
Skorneck, Group Wary of 'Repressed Memories,' PHOENIX GAZETTE, Nov. 11, 1994, at
A17 (quoting members of the APA task force); see also APA Issues Report on "Re-
pressed Memories, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 11, 1994, at B3; Bill Hendrick, Child Abuse
Found To Be 'Pervasive', But False Memories Also Seen As Problem, ATLANTA J.,
Nov. 11, 1994, at C1. Consequently, while the debate about false memory continues to
rage, answers are nowhere in sight.
165. Hypnotic capacity is a trait that can be measured. A number of tests and
scales exist for measuring it. See HILGARD, supra note 38, at 257-66; Kanovitz, supra
note 2, at 1238 n.227. Multiples tend to score higher than any other clinical popula-
tion. See supra note 49.
166. In the following passage, Dr. George Ganaway describes the traits found in the
highly hypnotizable that heighten their vulnerability to suggestion:
There is a posture of trust in interpersonal situations described by Spiegel as
"an intense beguilingly innocent expectation of support from others in a
somewhat atavistic, prelinguistic mode . . .that goes beyond reasonable limits
to become postured and demanding." This can become a pathological compli-
ance with people in the environment, including the therapist. Susjension of
critical judgment refers to the readiness to replace current premises and
beliefs with new ones without the careful cognitive screening that usually
takes place in less hypnotizable persons. This is consistent with another char-
acteristic of this group, trance logic, which was originally described by Orne
(1959) as the capacity to be unaware of even extreme logical incongrui-
ty .... Highs are known as well for an intense capacity for concentration
or focused attention, and for dissociating as they are doing so. This trait has
been observed and measured experimentally by others as absorption. They
also possess an excellent memory, often being able to store and recall espe-
cially visual detail in the manner that a sponge absorbs water. Spiegel notes
that this learning is usually uncritical and all-inclusive, which is explained by
the above-noted suspension of critical judgment, as well as by another char-
acteristic of this group: a marked propensity to affiliation with new events
with an almost magnetic attraction.
GANAWAY, supra note 121, at 208 (citations omitted). Many sources discuss the cogni-
tive traits and personality characteristics associated with high hypnotic capacity. See
Buss, supra note 4, at 66-81, 98-99; HILGARD, supra note 38, at 163-65; HIwGARD, supra
note 49; Kanovitz, supra note 2, at 1235-38 nn.214-27; Martin T. Orne et al., Recon-
structing Memory Through Hypnosis: Forensic and Clinical Implications, in HYPNOSIS
AND MEMORY 21, 22-25 (Helen M. Pettinati ed., 1988); Spiegel, supra note 49, at 90-91;
Herbert Spiegel, The Grade 5 Syndrome: The Highly Hypnotizable Person, 22 INT'L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 303 (1974); Herbert Spiegel, Keynote Address at the
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a natural talent for picturing things.' They also tend to be gullible."
This combination makes it easy for them to picture suggested events and
believe these events have happened.'" Confusion about the past adds to
Eighth International Conference on Multiple Personality/Dissociative State (Nov. 15,
1991) (audiotape transcript available through Audio Transcript, Ltd.); see also supra
note 140.
167. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 140, 166 and accompanying text.
169. Experimental research studies have demonstrated that it is sometimes possible
to induce subjects who are highly hypnotizable to believe that they have experienced
things that have never happened. See, e.g., Kanovitz, supra note 2, at 1237-38, 1237-38
nn.221-26; J. R. Laurence et al., Duality, Dissociation, and Memory Creation in
Highly Hypnotizable Subjects, 34 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 295
(1986). For a fascinating account of how a highly hypnotizable father was induced to
believe that he was a member of a satanic cult and, along with others had perpetrat-
ed acts of satanic ritual abuse against all of his children, see Richard J. Ofshe, Inad-
vertent Hypnosis During Interrogation: False Conession Due to Dissociative State:
Misidentified Multiple Personality and the Satanic Cult Hypothesis, 40 INT'L J. CLINI-
CAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 125 (1992); see also MICHAEL D. YAPKO, TRANCEWORK
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF CLASSICAL HYPNOSIS 256-57 (2d ed. 1990). Dr.
Ganaway warns that "MPD patients should be considered at high risk for contamina-
tion by pseudomemories in the hands of therapists who unwittingly or not, verbally
or otherwise, cue them to respond to the therapists' expectations and needs." See
Ganaway, supra note 121, at 209.
The possibility of false memories being unwittingly implanted during psychothera-
py has recently become a subject of growing concern and controversy inside the
mental health field. See TERR, supra note 164, at 161 (noting that "a suggestive, tech-
nique used on a suggestible patient may wreak all kinds of havoc"); YAPKO, supra
note 164, at 20-31, 89-91 (claiming that suggestive techniques are largely responsible
for false memories); Christine M. Comstock, Believe It or Not: The Challenge to the
Therapist of Patient Memory, 2 TREATING ABUSE TODAY 12 (1992) (noting that "hyp-
nosis does not guarantee the objective accuracy of the memory"); Frankel, supra
note 3, at 954 (evaluating recent studies, considering the effect of hypnotism on re-
call of childhood memories, and concluding that adult reports of childhood trauma
are not reliable); Ganaway, supra note 121, at 209 (discussing risks of false memories
being assimilated during hypnosis); Grinfeld & Reisman, supra note 146, at 1 (dis-
cussing false memories); Thomas G. Gutheil, Commentary: True Recollections of a
False Memory Case; Ramona Has Ominous Implications for Psychiatrists, PSYCHIAT-
RIC TIMES, July 1994, at 18 (discussing the first case in which a parent successfully
sued his child's psychotherapist for implanting false memories of childhood sexual
abuse); supra notes 11 (discussing the number of people who may have MSD), 146
(discussing polarization of the field regarding pseudomemories), 164 (discussing con-
troversy over planted memories). The concern has spread, and articles are now regu-
larly appearing in the memory research and legal literatures, as well as in the popu-
lar media. See supra notes 10-11, 146, 163 and accompanying text; see also Kanovitz,
supra note 2, at 1234-38 (expressing concerns about memory restoring techniques
used in psychotherapy, but arguing that hypnosis is no more likely to implant false
a multiple's vulnerability.7 ' For patients who are confused, psychother-
apy constructions that appear to make sense out of clinical symptoms
are hard to resist because they satisfy a natural human longing for an-
swers. 
71
The protracted and tedious process of gathering traumatic memories,
reassembling them, and integrating them into conscious awareness can
take place only in professional treatment. Dissociated memories can
never be reassembled for the first time on the witness stand. Conse-
quently, juries will rarely have an opportunity to hear and evaluate a
multiple's original unspoiled memory impressions. The testimony the jury
hears in the courtroom will represent the end product of months, and
sometimes years, of psychotherapy. This testimony will be based on
dissociated memories that have been gathered, reassembled, and repeat-
edly reviewed in therapy.' Rehearsals tend to harden memory and
memories than other suggestive psychotherapy techniques); Loftus, supra note 10, at
518, 534 (urging greater responsibility in encouraging patients to bring restored mem-
ory sexual abuse suits); Ofshe, supra (describing a case of a false memory confes-
sion to satanic ritual abuse); Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Recovered Mem-
ories of Alleged Sexual Abuse: Lawsuits Against Parents, 10 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L.
483 (1992) (voicing skepticism about authenticity of repressed memory); Marianne
Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REV.
331, 341-42 (1985) (questioning whether therapists possess special expertise in deter-
mining historic truth); Walter Young, Observations on the Fantasy Formation of Mul-
tiple Personality Disorder, 1 DISSOCIATION: PROGRESS IN THE DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS
13 (1988) (discussing the role of fantasy in the development of MPD).
170. This confusion causes multiples to question the authenticity of their memories.
Dr. Putnam observes:
The questions of what really happened and when it happened are usually
sources of painful confusion for MPD patients. Confusion of past and present;
of real and unreal; and of dream, fantasy and memory may overwhelm them
at times. Not uncommonly, patients will retreat into a phase during which
they announce that they 'made it all up.' Closer questioning will reveal that
they do not know how or why they made it all up, and this assertion will
quickly crumble under scrutiny. Understandably, both patients and therapists
will wish for some tangible truth as to what really did happen. Sometimes
this is forthcoming. Dr. Wilbur was able to meet Sybil's father and hear him
confirm the truth of what she had been told (Schreiber, 1974). Unfortunately,
in the majority of cases, no hard incontrovertible evidence remains beyond
the physical and psychological scarring of the patients.
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 177.
171. See, e.g., DONALD P. SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND HIsTORIc TRUTH: MEANING
AND INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 161-214 (1982); YAPKo, supra note 164, at 101-
11; Kanovitz, supra note 2, at 1243-51 (discussing the impact of "talking cures").
172. During therapy, patients repeatedly go over the same disturbing memories.
Memories can be changed simply by the process of retelling them. See, e.g., Kanovitz,
supra note 2, at 1247-50. Repetition can cause reconstruction and hardening of mem-
ory. Matters originally vague and hazy can acquire synthetic delineation and sharpness
through the process of retelling. On the dangers of changing memory through repeat-
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make testimony resistant to cross-examination.'73
When testimony is based on restored memories, the accuracy of the
witness's recall will depend on the therapist's care and skill. "4 Psycho-
therapy is a human venture and, as such, can sometimes go astray."'
No defendant should have to answer to accusations based on a
therapist's handiwork without an opportunity to explore that handiwork
in open court. Oddly enough, this opportunity may be unobtainable if
psychotherapy-patient privilege statutes are given literal application.'76
For this reason, courts should not allow patients who bring recovered
memory lawsuits to invoke the psychotherapy-patient privilege. Such
invocation allows the patient to withhold from jurors information they
will need to evaluate the memory's authenticity.
The widely-recognized patient-litigant exception'7 provides the legal
justification for overriding the psychotherapy-patient privilege in recov-
ered-memory lawsuits. In bringing suit, a patient who places his mental
ed interviews, see Stephen Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal
Concerning the Psychology of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses,
45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 547, 554-55 (1984); see also John R. Christiansen, The Testimony
of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH.
L. REV. 705, 708-13 (1987) (discussing the effects on children's memories).
173. See supra note 172. The danger of memory hardening from retelling is proba-
bly greater in psychotherapy settings than in other contexts because traumatic memo-
ries are not simply retold; the past is relived, mourned, and grieved. See, e.g., BRIERE,
supra note 6, at 85-88 (discussing emotional catharsis). The emotional release intensi-
fies the memories. The risk of memory hardening is one of the reasons why many
jurisdictions disqualify witnesses who have experienced pretrial hypnosis from testify-
ing. See infra note 198 and accompanying text; see also Martin T. Orne, The Use and
Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311,
332-34 (1979); Peter W. Sheehan, Confidence, Memory, and Hypnosis, in HYPNOSIS
AND MEMORY 95 (Helen Pettinati ed., 1988).
174. For a discussion of how dissociated memories are retrieved and restored, see
supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 171, at 166-74 (discussing how a therapist's erro-
neous interpretations can reshape a patient's memory); Kanovitz supra note 2, at
1234-51 (discussing pseudomemories and "taldng cures"); supra notes 164, 169 (dis-
cussing the risks of memory planting).
176. For a list of sources on this issue, see supra notes 109-10.
177. This exception is triggered when patients make their mental states an issue in
a lawsuit By placing their mental states in controversy, the patients waive privilege
on this issue. At least 22 states and the District of Columbia recognize the patient-lit-
igation exception in their privilege statutes. See Weiner, supra note 109, at 567, 592-
96. The courts of numerous other states also recognize the exception. Id. at 567. For
a more thorough discussion of the patient-litigant exception, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 109, § 5543.
state in controversy waives the psychotherapy-patient privilege regarding
matters the patient has raised." The rationale behind the patient-liti-
gant exception is that, in electing to make private affairs public, the pa-
tient no longer retains any privacy, so there is none to protect. It would
be unfair to allow the patient to invoke the psychotherapy-patient privi-
lege and thus claim a monopoly on vital information concerning issues
that he has raised.7'
The patient-litigant exception does not apply to recovered-memory
suits, in that the litigant does not place her mental state in issue. Yet,
the policy reasons underlying this exception compels its use in this situ-
ation."u The clinical profession is now engaged in a major debate over
the reliability of recovered memories. 8 ' The legal system cannot afford
178. The language of the following Arkansas statute is typical:
There is no privilege under this rule as to a communication relevant to an
issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim
or defense.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Mitchie 1994) (adopting the Uniform Rules of Evidence).
179. Harvard Law Review summarized the policies underlying the patient litigant
exception:
[A patient who puts her mental state in issue] has a much-reduced, if not
nonexistent, expectation of privacy because she herself brings the issue to
public attention. Important fairness considerations justify this exception: an
individual who wishes to receive the benefits of the judicial system should
not be allowed to impose an additional burden on the system by withholding
necessary information central to her claim.
Developments in the Law, supra note 109, at 1554; see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 109, §§ 5543 (patient-litigant exception), 5552 (waiver); Saltzburg, supra note 109,
at 622-25.
180. See supra notes 177-79.
181. For a general discussion of recovered memory concerns, see supra notes 11,
164, 169. The debate has spread to legal literature. See generally Larry B. Spikes &
Angela L. Rud, "Restored Recollections": Claims Based on Repressed Memories of
Abuse, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 89 (1995); Christina Bannon, Comment, Recovered Memories
of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Should the Courts Get Involved When Mental Health
Professionals Disagree?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 835 (1994); Matthew J. Eisenberg, Comment,
Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: The Admissibility Question, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 249 (1995); Monica L. Hayes, Note, The Necessity of Memory Experts
for the Defense in Prosecutions for Child Sexual Abuse Based upon Repressed Mem-
ories, 32 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 69 (1994); Joy Lazo, Comment, True or False: Expert
Testimony on Repressed Memory, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1345 (1995); Julie M. Murray,
Comment, Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility: A Call for Limitations on the
Admissibility of Repressed Memory in Sexual Abuse Trials, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 477
(1995); Colette M. Smith, Comment, Recovered Memories of Alleged Sexual Abuse: An
Analysis of the Theory of Repressed Memories Under the Washington Rules of Evi-
dence, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 51 (1994). Some commentators have questioned whether
testimony based on recovered memories should be admitted into evidence at all. See,
e.g., State v. Hungerford, Nos. 94-S-045 to 94-S-047, 93-S-1734 to 93-S-1936, 1995 WL
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to ignore this debate by allowing patients who bring recovered memory
lawsuits to keep the origin and ancestry of their memories from the jury.
Treatment rooms must be exposed to the jury's scrutiny when evidence
of recovered memories is presented. By testifying about recovered mem-
ories, the plaintiff must waive the psychotherapy-patient privilege to
permit the court to explore how the memories were restored.
VII. IMPACT OF TREATMENT HYPNOSIS ON
TESTIMONIAL COMPETENCE
Hypnosis is widely used in the treatment of multiple personality disor-
der. 2 Many of the uses do not involve memory work. Hypnosis, for ex-
378571, at *1-3 (N.H. Super. Ct 1995). Others would admit such testimony only if the
judge, after conducting a pretrial hearing into the circumstances surrounding recovery
of the memories, determines that the testimony is reliable. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra,
at 258-59; Murray, supra, at 517. Still others would leave the determination of wheth-
er or not to accept such testimony to the jury, but would give the jury the benefit
of expert testimony about the memory hazards. See, e.g., Hayes, supra, at 79. This
Article will not address the various proposals other than to say that courts should
think long and hard before deciding to exclude testimony based on recovered mem-
ory. Such a decision would disqualify virtually all witnesses with MPD from testifying
about traumas they have endured. In Thornton v. State, an Indiana court declined to
exclude such testimony. 653 N.E.2d 493, 496-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The court ruled
that undergoing memory integration therapy did not provide an adequate reason for
excluding a multiple's testimony. Id.
182. Hypnosis is used in the psychotherapy of multiple personality disorder for (a)
developing therapeutic rapport, (b) accessing personality states, (c) managing affect
and behavior, (d) penetrating and dismantling anesic barriers, (e) mediating and
resolving internal conflicts between identities, (f) defusing dangerous and self-destruc-
tive behaviors, (g) facilitating abreactive work, (h) achieving personality integration,
and (i) developing nondissociative coping skills. For a discussion of these and other
uses, see, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 36-65, 193-230; BLOCH, supra note 22, at 73-76;
PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 218-52; Richard P. Kluft, Using Hypnotic Inquiry Protocols
to Monitor Treatment Progress and Stability in Multiple Personality Disorder, 28
AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 63, 65 (1985); Richard P. Kluft, Varieties of Hypnotic Inter-
ventions in the Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder, in 24 AM. J. CLINICAL
HYPNOSIS 230 (1982); Miller, Hypnotherapy in a Co.ase of Dissociated Incest, 34 INT'L
CLMcAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 13 (1986). In addition, hypnosis can help many
people to relax, manage pain, reduce stress, strengthen the ego, develop self-esteem,
build motivation, and desensitize phobias. See, e.g., D. CORYDON HAMMOND, HANDBOOK
OF HYPNOTIC SUGGESTIONS AND METAPHORS 1 (D. Corydon Hammond ed., 1990); Fred
H. Frankel, Significant Developments in Medical Hypnosis During the Past 25 Years,
35 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 231 (1987); Erika Fromm, Significant
Developments in Clinical Hypnosis During the Past 25 Years, 35 INT'L J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 215 (1987). Many leading therapists believe that hypnosis is
ample, is sometimes employed to manage suicidal behavior by using
hypnotic suggestion to put self-destructive states to sleep until the next
session." Hypnotic applications that do not involve memory work
should not trouble courts, because such applications have no power to
change memory.'" However, one use for hypnosis in MPD treatment is
the uncovering and abreacting of memories."n
There are important reasons why hypnosis is used for memory work
with multiples.'" The reason multiples lack conscious recall of their
traumatic experiences is that they were in a dissociative/self-hypnotic
state when the memories were stored.'87 Hypnosis returns them to a
state corresponding to the original one. Memories are state-dependent in
the sense that information encoded while a person is in a particular state
is best remembered when the person is again in a similar state." This
mismatch in states explains why people who are depressed cannot re-
member the good things that happen to them. This also explains why
therapists sometimes think that multiples need to undergo controlled or
indispensable to the treatment of MPD. PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 227.
183. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 74.
184. See, e.g., McGlauflin v. State, 857 P.2d 366, 379 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (finding
rule disqualifying previously hypnotized witnesses inapplicable to witness who con-
sulted a hypnotherapist for weight loss).
185. "Abreaction" refers to the emotional reliving of affect-laden experiences. See,
e.g., BLOCH, supra note 22, at 60. This process is an integral part of the psychothera-
py of trauma-induced disorders. See, e.g., BRIERE, supra note 6, at 85-88. Abreaction
has to occur in order to drain traumatic memories of their emotional force so that
they can be metabolized and assimilated. Hypnosis intensifies the patient's emotional
discharge and brings about a faster and more lasting and durable recovery. See, e.g.,
Buss, supra note 4, 78-91.
186. See, e.g., Kanovitz, supra note 2, at 1212-16.
187. See supra notes 53-57, 97-104 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., James M. Swanson & Marcel Kinsbourne, State-Dependent Learning
and Retrieval: Methodological Cautions and Theoretical Considerations, in FUNCTION-
AL DISORDERS OF MEMORY 275 (John F. Kihlstrom & Frederick H. Evans eds., 1979);
Spiegel, Victims of Sexual Abuse, supra note 41, at 399. The following passage sum-
marizes contemporary assumptions about the conditions necessary to stimulate the
retrieval mechanisms of memory:
Today, most theorists assume that how well something is remembered de-
pends not only on what that something is, or how it was encoded, but also
on the circumstances that surround its retrieval. Accordingly, remembering is
now conceptualized as a joint product or interaction between information that
has been stored in the past and information that is present in the cognitive
environment of the rememberer .... Studies showing that memory perfor-
mance depends on the similarity or match between drug or mood states at
encoding and retrieval thus square with this interactive view of remembering,
and thereby strengthen its appeal.
Janet M. Eich, Theoretical Issues in State Dependent Memory, in ORGANIZATION OF
MEMORY 331, 334 (Endel Tulvig & Wayne Donaldson eds., 1972).
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spontaneous hypnosis to remember traumatic experiences.'" Resump-
tion of a state that matches the patient's state when the memories were
encoded supplies the associative network needed to stimulate retrieval
mechanisms of memory.' ° As Dr. Eugene Bliss succinctly put it, "The
path into the cave is the path leading out."'..
Hypnosis offers a second advantage in the psychotherapy of
MPD-control. The penetration of amnesic barriers exposes the patient
to the risks of being flooded and overwhelmed by intensely affect-laden
memories. With hypnosis, the patient's dissociative memory barriers can
be dismantled gradually, in a controlled manner, and at a pace the pa-
tient can tolerate. 92 When the patient's limits of coping with trauma-
related recall are reached, the patient can be brought out of hypnosis
with permission to remember "only as much as of this session as you
can manage."" Techniques also exist for modulating the intensity of
memories by providing the patient with emotional distance from the
event. "
Hypnotic memory work is certain to provide a challenge to a multiple's
testimonial competence. When hypnosis first became a legal issue, courts
took the position that pretrial hypnosis affected a witness's credibility,
not his competence. 5 During the 1980s, however, a majority of courts
189. See supra notes 53-57, 97-101 and accompanying text.
190. See Buss, supra note 4, at 112-14; HILGARD, supra note 38, at 244-45; Kanovitz,
supra note 2, at 1214-15; Spiegel, Hypnosis, supra note 51, at 915; Spiegel, Victims
of Sexual Abuse, supra note 41, at 300.
191. See Buss, supra note 4, at 112.
192. See BLoCH, supra note 22, at 74-75; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 131-32; Kanovitz,
supra note 2, at 1215-16; Spiegel, Hypnosis, supra note 51, at 914-16; Spiegel, Vic-
tims of Sexual Abuse, supra note 41, at 300-02.
193. See BLOCH, supra note 22, at 75.
194. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 231-34 (listing several healing techniques);
Spiegel, Hypnosis, supra note 51, at 914-16. The patient, for example, can be told to
project the memory on an imaginary television screen so that the patient can watch
the experience from a safe distance. Spiegel, Hypnosis, supra note 51, at 914-16.
195. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.) ("The fact of
hypnosis, if disclosed to the jury, may affect the credibility of evidence, but not its
admissibility."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503
F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that post-hypnotic testimony is not "inherent-
ly untrustworthy"); Creamer v. State, 205 S.E.2d 240, 241-42 (Ga. 1974) (stating that
hypnosis prior to testimony does not render a witness incompetent); State v.
McQueen, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-28 (N.C. 1978) (deciding that hypnosis affects credibility
rather than competency of a witness), overruled by State v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177,
188 (N.C. 1984) ("[Hiypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible in judicial pro-
ceedings."); State v. Jorgensen, 492 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Or. Ct. App. 1971) (refusing to
switched gears. These changes came about because of findings in a num-
ber of laboratory research studies. These studies questioned whether
hypnosis was able to improve the memory of eyewitnesses and suggested
that its use for this purpose might make testimony unreliable. '96
Alarmed by these reports, 7 a majority of courts did an about face and
held that witnesses who had undergone hypnosis were incompetent to
testify, except as to matters they demonstrably recalled before the ses-
sion began."°
exclude testimony following hypnosis and psychiatric examinations).
196. Some studies have found that hypnosis improves memory performance. See,
e.g., Gordon L. Stager & Richard M. Lundy, Hypnosis and the Learning and Recall
of Visually Presented Material, 33 INT'L J. CUNICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 27
(1985). However, most studies have been less favorable. See, e.g., Mathew H. Erdelyi,
Hyperamnesia: The Effect of Hypnosis, Fantasy, and Concentration, in HYPNOSIS AND
MEMORY 64 (Helen M. Pettinati ed., 1988) (finding that hypnosis increases memory
productivity at the expense of accuracy by making the subject more willing to
guess); William H. Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness Memory, 26
INT'L J. CUNICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 437, 444 (1979) (finding that hypnotized
subjects are more vulnerable than waking state subjects to leading questions);
Sheehan, supra note 173, at 95 (finding that hypnosis artificially increases confidence
in memory accuracy); Graham F. Wagstaff, Hypnosis and the Law: The Role of In-
duction in Witness Recall, in MODERN TRENDS IN HYPNOSIS 345, 346 (David Waxman
et al. eds., 1985) (finding that hypnosis has no advantage over waking state concen-
tration for subjects who have normally functioning memories); Mark Zelig & William
B. Beidleman, The Investigative Use of Hypnosis: A Word of Caution, 29 INT'L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 401 (1981) (finding that hypnotized subjects are
more likely to succumb to leading questions).
197. Dr. Bernard Diamond and Dr. Martin Orne were instrumental in shaping the
attitude of the courts toward hypnosis. Each wrote a number of highly influential
articles interpreting hypnosis laboratory research findings for the courts. See generally
Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Pro-
spective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313 (1982) (characterizing using pretrial hypnosis to
refresh a witness's memory as being "tantamount to . . . fabrication of evidence");
Martin T. Orne et al., Hypnotically Induced Testimony, in EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 171 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984)
(stating that hypnosis may instill a false sense of confidence in memory accuracy,
making the witness difficult to cross-examine). Their conclusions may have been, and
probably were, slightly bleaker than data from available scientific studies warranted.
See 27 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 109, § 6011, at 143-44; Kanovitz, supra note 2,
at 1234 n.212, 1253 n.296.
198. See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 139 (Alaska 1986) (admitting testimony
only regarding facts known prior to hypnosis); State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274, 1279-80
(Ariz. 1981) (en banc) ("[Tlestimony of witnesses which has been tainted by hypnosis
should be excluded in criminal cases."), modified, Arizona ex re. Collins v. Superior
Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc) (finding that the rule in Mena
should not be given retroactive effect); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1365-66
(Cal.) (en banc) (refusing to adopt "safeguards" as a means to make hypnotically
refreshed memories admissible), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); Stokes v. State, 548
So. 2d 188, 196 (Fla. 1989) (stating that witness may not testify as to facts remem-
bered after hypnosis); People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 514 (Ill. 1989) ("[A] witness
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Courts have rarely had occasion to consider the impact of therapeutic
hypnosis on testimony. In the few cases where this issue has arisen,
however, courts have generally refused to attach special significance to
the fact that the hypnosis was undertaken for treatment."9 Neverthe-
other than the defendant himself may not offer testimony to the extent that it is en-
hanced through hypnosis."); State v. Haislip, 701 P.2d 909, 923-26 (Kan.) (discussing
dangers of post-hypnotic memories and finding them inadmissible as a result), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044 (Md. 1983) (using
Frye test to find "hypnotically enhanced testimony" inadmissible); People v. Gonzales,
329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Mich. 1982) (holding that hypnosis makes the testimony unreli-
able and hinders defendants' right to cross-examination); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764, 772 (Minn. 1980) (refusing to admit post-hypnotic testimony); Alsbach v. Bader,
700 S.W.2d 823, 830 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (finding that hypnotically refreshed memo-
ries lack reliability); State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654-55 (Neb. 1981) (refusing to
analyze post-hypnotic testimony on a case-by-case basis); People v. Hughes, 453
N.E.2d 484, 489 (N.Y. 1983) ("[H]ypnosis is an inherently suggestive procedure.");
State v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177, 187 (N.C. 1984) (noting that "hypnotically refreshed
testimony is simply too unreliable to be used as evidence"); Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170, 178 (Pa. 1981) (stating that "hypnotically-refreshed testimo-
ny" has not yet been shown to be reliable).
A substantial minority of courts took a closer look at the hypnosis laboratory re-
search findings and determined that the results were not as gloomy as a majority of
the courts believed. These courts adopted an intermediate position. The New Jersey
Supreme Court took the lead in State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981). Recognizing
that hypnosis was more appropriate for certain types of memory loss than others, the
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that witnesses could testify about memories re-
trieved through hypnosis if hypnosis was appropriate for the type of memory loss
involved and the session was conducted in conformity with a rigid set of procedures
designed to safeguard against guiding the witness's recall. Id. at 94-95. The New Jer-
sey approach is now followed in several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., House v. State,
445 So. 2d 815, 824 (Miss. 1984); State v. Beachum, 643 P.2d 246, 254 (N.M. Ct. App.
1981), cert. quashed by 644 P.2d 1040 (1982); State v. Weston, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984). A few courts have modified the Hurd approach by considering
factors besides compliance with procedural safeguards in deciding whether hypnot-
ically enhanced testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in a legal proceed-
ings. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1017 (Colo. 1987) (en banc), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988); State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (Idaho 1984). Finally,
a few courts continue to follow the original position, that hypnosis only affects the
witness's credibility and not competence to testify. See, e.g., Pearson v. State, 441
N.E.2d 468, 473 (Ind. 1982), post conviction relief granted in part, 543 N.E.2d 1141
(1989); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d
138, 151 (N.D. 1983); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Wyo. 1982).
199. See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1508 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding
testimony in regard to hypnosis inadmissible because therapist not qualified), affd, 68
F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995); McGlauflin v. State, 857 P.2d 366, 380 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that rule excluding hypnotized witness testimony applies both to forensic
less, there are three reasons why courts should not disqualify multiples
from testifying on the basis that they have experienced treatment hypno-
sis. First, hypnosis memory researchers have never tested the effective-
ness of hypnosis on patients suffering from dissociative amnesias. Unfa-
vorable findings in hypnosis experiments have come from studies involv-
ing subjects with normally functioning memories."M The American Medi-
cal Association Counsel on Scientific Affairs has cautioned that these
studies do not provide definitive answers about the workings of hypnosis
on subjects who suffer from psychological memory blocks. °'
Second, the standard justification for disqualifying lay witnesses who
have undergone hypnosis has been the Frye rule.2"2 Courts took nega-
and therapeutic hypnosis); State v. Moreno, 709 P.2d 103, 105 (Haw. 1985) (holding
that witness may only testify as to matter brought out in hypnosis if those matters
recollected prior to hypnosis); Tardi v. Henry, 571 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (Ill. App. Ct.)
(holding that hypnotically induced testimony is per se inadmissible), appeal denied,
580 N.E.2d 136 (M. 1991); People v. Reese, 385 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that testimony from therapeutic and forensic hypnosis inadmissible);
State v. Grimmet, 459 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that witness
should be allowed to testify as to matters recalled prior to hypnosis); People v.
Schreiner, 573 N.E.2d 552, 556 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that hypnotically induced testimo-
ny not admissible because not generally accepted in scientific community); West v.
Howard, 601 N.E.2d 528, 533-34 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding plaintiffs testimony
inadmissible as it was refreshed by self-hypnosis), jurisdictional motion overruled by
585 N.E.2d 835 (1992). But see Landry v. Bill Garrett Chevrolet, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1051,
1056 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that hypnosis should not be excluded as a matter of
law), rev'd, 434 So. 2d 1103 (La. 1983); State v. Varela, 817 P.2d 731, 733-34 (N.M.
Ct. App.) (allowing hypnotically refreshed testimony if Hurd safeguards are met), cert.
denied, 816 P.2d 509 (N.M. 1991).
200. Kanovitz, supra note 2, at 1221-23.
201. See Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection by
the Use of Hypnosis, 253 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1918, 1921-22 (1985).
There are many reasons why hypnosis is likely to be more effective in overcom-
ing dissociative amnesias than in improving eyewitness recall. See Kanovitz, supra
note 2, at 1224-34. Even if this cannot be demonstrated, however, the legal system
should not disqualify patients who have undergone hypnotic treatments. Such disquali-
fication will damage the practice of psychotherapy. See id. at 1252-62. The mental
health field has not been blessed with refined tools for performing memory. work. Id.
at 1243-45. In nonhypnotic therapies, repressed memories are often restored through
free associations, dream interpretation, and sometimes outright suggestion. Id. at 1243-
45. These techniques are no more certain to produce reliable recall than hypnosis.
202. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye involved the
admissibility of expert opinion based on interpretation of the results of a polygraph
test. Id. at 1013. The court of appeals refused to admit the testimony, stating that
when expert testimony is based on a scientific gadget, technique, or device, the
"thing" from which the expert testimony is deduced "must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at
1014. Despite its many shortcomings, the Frye test gained rapid acceptance and be-
came the dominant standard for the admission of scientific evidence for more than a
half century. For a comprehensive analysis of the Frye rule, see generally Paul C.
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tive comments in several published studies as evidence that hypnosis had
not gained sufficient acceptance in the scientific community as a reliable
method of restoring memory."n It is unclear whether excluding the tes-
timony of lay witnesses was ever an appropriate application of Frye."
Even if this application was appropriate a decade ago, however, courts in
jurisdictions that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence must re-
consider using Frye to exclude witnesses. Rule 702205 supersedes the
Frye test,'°6 requiring courts to re-examine rules disqualifying lay wit-
nesses who have undergone hypnosis. 7
Third, and most important, disqualifying multiples who have undergone
formal trance inductions as part of their treatment accomplishes nothing.
It will not get hypnosis out of treatment rooms because multiple person-
ality is a disorder of self-hypnotism.2" Multiples often spontaneously
enter into a trance while undergoing treatment."n The only consequence
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Hatf-Century Later, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) (discussing the application of the
Frye test in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence).
203. See, e.g., Contreras v. State 718 P.2d 129, 136 (Alaska 1986) (stating that "the
'science' of hypnosis is far too underdeveloped to qualify under the Frye standard");
People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1377-80 (Cal. 1982) (discussing expert criticism of
hypnotically refreshed memories); State v. Peoples, :319 S.E.2d 177, 188 (N.C. 1984)
(noting that "hypnosis has not reached a level of scientific acceptance which justifies
its use for courtroom purposes"); Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, 237-39, 241-42 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988) (listing variations of expert analysis of Frye standard in relation to
hypnosis); Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 362, 369 (Va. Ct. App. 1984) (relying on
one expert's testimony that post-hypnotic memories are unreliable).
204. For an insightful analysis of why excluding hypnotically enhanced testimony on
the basis of Frye is a misapplication of the Frye rule, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 109, § 6011, at 132-47.
205. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. § 702.
206. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993).
While the Supreme Court's Daubert holding constitutes binding authority only on
federal courts, it operates as persuasive authority in state courts, particularly in those
with rules of evidence patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence.
207. See, e.g., Rowland v. Commonwealth, 901 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Ky. 1995); WIGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 109, § 6011, at 13247 (discussing how the Frye test is super-
seded by the Federal Rules of Evidence).
208. Supra notes 48-62, 139-53 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 69-78; PUTNAM, supra note 1, at 219-20 (citing
of disqualifying multiples who experience formal trance inductions would
be to reduce the effectiveness of therapy by discouraging a technique
that many specialists believe is indispensable to proper care of this diffi-
cult patient population."' The admission of testimony by witnesses with
this disorder will raise credibility concerns.' Treatment hypnosis will
aggravate them. Yet, barring mentally disturbed witnesses from testifying
because they have undergone psychologically-indicated treatment is over-
ly harsh. Jurors can be educated about the possible memory hazards
from the treatments through expert testimony and cautionary instruc-
tions."2
numerous studies of spontaneous trance states):
210. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text; see also supra note 181 (pro-
viding sources that discuss this issue).
211. See supra parts V, VI.
212. In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), the Supreme Court ruled that hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony is not so resistant to adversarial testing that a criminal
defendant who has undergone hypnotic memory enhancement can be denied the right
to testify on his own behalf. Id. at 61-62. The Court pointed out the adversary sys-
tem has mechanisms other than disqualifying witnesses to protect juries against the
danger of overvaluing hypnotically enhanced testimony. Id. at 60-61. Jurors can be
"educated to the risks of hypnosis through expert testimony and cautionary instruc-
tions." Id. at 61. The availability of these mechanisms made wholesale exclusion of a
defendant's hypnotically enhanced testimony improper. Id. While the actual holding in
Rock is narrow, resting on the right of a criminal defendant to testify in his own
behalf, the Supreme Court's expression of confidence in the ability of the adversary
system to survive the introduction of hypnotically enhanced testimony is pertinent
here as well. See id. at 60-62. Added protection can be provided by requiring inde-
pendent corroboration as a condition to admitting memories recovered during hypno-
therapy sessions. See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Conn. 1994)
(stating that concerns regarding hypnotically refreshed memories can be alleviated by
instituting certain safeguards), affd, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995).
A Georgia court recently confronted a closely related issue in Dorsey v. State,
426 S.E.2d 224 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). The court was concerned with the impact of self-
hypnotism on a multiple's competence to testify. Id. at 226-28. The defense argued
that dissociation involves self-hypnotism and that a witness who needs to dissociate
(i.e., switch identities) in order to testify was incompetent because the witness
would, in effect, be testifying in an autohypnotic state. Id. at 226-27. While the court
was confused about the relationship between dissociation and self-hypnotism, the
court nevertheless came to the right conclusion. The court held that the fact that the
"victim's perceptions in a dissociative state might sometimes be incomplete or distort-
ed was a proper subject of argument to the jury regarding why it should discount
her testimony, but . . . did not render the victim incompetent to testify." Id. at 228.
While the Dorsey court was concerned with the impact of self-hypnotism, more
precisely self-hypnotism occurring on the witness stand, disqualifying witnesses who
undergo formal treatment inductions while accepting witnesses who spend a signifi-
cant part of their lives in self-hypnotic trance states would be hard to defend. See
supra notes 120-54, 199-211 and accompanying text. The memory hazards from hypno-
sis do not materialize when a hypnotist counts to 10. The hazards inhere in the hyp-
notic state and in the personality characteristics of subjects who are highly hypnotiz-
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CONCLUSION
A variety of problems associated with MPD can impair performance as
a witness. The problems appear so diverse and complicated that judges
may be tempted to wash their hands of multiples and run. This would be
a mistake. MPD is strongly linked with childhood trauma. Despite their
many problems, multiples will often have much that is accurate, mean-
ingful, and important to tell juries.
With rare exceptions, judges should admit multiples' testimony. Never-
theless, they should do so fully aware of the testimony's potential short-
comings and of the difficulty the defense will have in cross-examining
the witness. This Article suggests three ways to maximize a multiple's
testimony. First, to whatever extent the witness's illness may allow, judg-
es should hold multiples to the same standards and treat them in the
same manner as other witnesses. This approach is likely to improve their
testimony. Second, judges should not allow multiples to shift the entire
burden of coping with their handicaps onto their adversaries. The burden
must be shared. Dividing the burden will, at times, require multiples to
disclose intensely private information contained in their treatment re-
cords. Multiples and their therapists will need to weigh this risk and its
implications for the treatment before deciding to make accusations in a
legal forum. Finally, and most important, judges must never forget, when
dealing with a multiple, that there is only one person on the witness
stand. Trying to see the world through the eyes of a multiple will be
disastrous for the legal system.
able. See supra notes 139-54, 164-70 and accompanying text. Disqualifying multiples
who have experienced treatment applications of hypnosis will not eliminate these
problems. See supra notes 164-70. Consequently, courts should treat the impact of
hypnosis on a multiple's recall-whether spontaneous or orchestrated by the thera-
pist-as one of the many factors jurors will need to weigh in evaluating a multiple's
credibility.

